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 In this dissertation I assess the impact of developing country trade 
liberalization on their wage inequality by focusing on two possible channels, namely 
job formality and inter-industry wage premium. 
 Informal workers are a large share of the workforce, more than 30% in Brazil 
and Colombia, and this share within manufacturing has increased in some countries 
that underwent trade liberalization. In chapter one I develop a theoretical model that 
endogenously generates informal jobs due to a payroll tax, and in which domestic and 
foreign import tariffs affect the industry-level share of informal workers and the 
formal-informal wage gap. My model predicts that a decrease in import tariffs 
increases both the informality share and the formal-informal wage gap, whereas a 
decrease in foreign tariffs has the opposite effect.  
 In chapter two I verify if these predictions are supported by data from the 
Brazilian trade liberalization episode (1989-2001), which contain information bout 
  
workers’ employment, demographic characteristics, and payroll tax compliance. To 
avoid endogeneity concerns I employ an instrumental variables technique. I find that 
a percentage point decrease in import tariffs leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase 
in the informality share and a 0.4 percentage point increase in the wag gap. A 
percentage point reduction in foreign tariffs implies a decrease of 0.35 percentage 
point in the informal share and a 0.17 percentage point decrease in the wage gap.  
 In chapter three I investigate the inter-industry wage premium channel by 
focusing on two aspects ignored by the existing literature. The first is whether trade 
policy affects wage premium for tradable and non-tradable industries diff rently. The 
second aspect is if productivity determines both the wage premium and import tariffs, 
then its omission will generate inconsistent estimates of the effect of import tariffs. 
Using late 1980s data from the Colombian trade liberalization episode, I find that 
only the tradable and manufacturing industries wage premia are sensitiv  to changes 
in import tariffs. Furthermore, productivity is an important determinant of the wage 
premium and the import tariff (as an included instrument). Its omission generates a 
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 The significant trade liberalization episodes that occurred in many developing 
countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s raised several concerns about the effec s of 
trade policy changes on wage inequality in these countries. Several labor market 
outcomes can impact wage inequality directly, such as return to skills, inter-industry 
wage premium (part of the wage that is attributed to the worker's industry affiliation), 
and type of job (formal or informal). 
 The changes in return to skills cannot account entirely for the change in the 
wage inequality in Mexico (Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996), Colombia (Attanasio, 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004), and Brazil (Gonzaga, Menezes and Terra, 2005). 
Therefore, researchers began to consider whether trade policy culd affect wage 
inequality through the other channels mentioned earlier, namely type of job (formal 
and informal) and inter-industry wage premium. This is the path I follow in this 
dissertation. 
 The informality channel is important because informal labor markets ar  large 
in developing countries (cf. Perry et al., 2007). In particular at leasa third of the jobs 
in Brazil and Colombia are informal jobs, as reported by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003), Kugler (1999) and Neri (2002). Job informality affects wage inequality 
because informal jobs pay systematically lower wages, and if trade policy changes 
don't affect industries uniformly, then wage inequality will increas  in informality 
prone industries, which are also intensive in unskilled workers.  
 At the same time of the trade reforms, Perry at al. (2007) reported a significant 




there's scarcely any literature about the causal link between trade policy changes and 
informal labor markets in developing countries. To fill this gap, in chapter 1 I develop 
a theoretical model in which trade policy changes affect the formal status of jobs.  
 The conceptual and empirical difficulties in identifying informal workers are 
some of the reasons why people have not invested much time studying informality. 
For Latin America, however, there’s increasing evidence that informality is related to 
the costs of having a legal contract, and payroll taxes are the major part of this cost.  
 My first contribution is to model theoretically the payroll tax compliance as 
the key distinction between formal and informal workers, and thus provide a 
mechanism that generates informal jobs endogenously. Then, I generalize the Davis 
and Harrigan (2007) trade model by embedding this mechanism in a general 
equilibrium model. My theoretical model considers the effects of changes in trade 
policy on two outcomes related to informal labor markets: the industry-level share of 
informal workers and the formal-informal wage gap, which is the diffrence between 
the average formal and informal wages. The trade policy options cidered are 
changes in the import tariff and changes in the trade partners’ import tariff (export 
barriers). The latter is my second contribution to the literature, since the effect of the 
export side of the economy has been ignored both theoretically and empirically so f r.  
 More specifically, my model predicts that a decrease in foreign trade barriers 
affects the firms by two channels. The first channel is through the increase in the 
volume exported, which raises formal employment by the existing exporters and the 
new exporting firms. The second channel is through the exit of the least productive 




dominated by the first channel under reasonable conditions on the joint distribut on of 
productivity and wage. In this case, foreign liberalization lowers the informality share 
and the formal-informal wage gap in a given industry. Similar comparative statics for 
own liberalization shows that industries with larger import tariff reductions have 
higher informality share and wage gap.  
 In chapter 2, I use the Brazilian trade liberalization (1989-2001) to test the 
predictions of my theoretical model. This is an important episode becaus  it allows 
the identification of informal workers in the data by the same crit rion used in the 
theoretical model, i.e. compliance with payroll taxes, and to the best of my 
knowledge it is the first time in the literature that this matching between theory and 
data is this close. Moreover, Brazil went through a trade liberalization program that 
reduced significantly its import tariffs and its trade partners also reduced substantially 
their import tariffs. Last, but not least, there was no change i labor regulations 
during this period. 
 An important finding is that the Brazilian import tariff is endogenous with 
respect to informal share and formal-informal wage gap. To circumvent this problem, 
I use an instrumental variable approach, and the instrument used is thetrade 
liberalization path of a similar country. Furthermore, when trade partner import tariffs 
are omitted from the estimated models, the estimates are not statis ically significant. 
This fact highlights the importance of not neglecting the export side of the economy 
as many studies of trade reforms do. 
 I assessed the industry-level informality share prediction by estimating the 




job. Contrary to the previous literature that reported no effect of trade on informality, 
my findings indicate that reducing within industry Brazilian import tariff by a 
percentage point increased informal share by 0.8 percentage points. On he other 
hand, a percentage point decrease in foreign tariff reduces informality by 0.4 
percentage points. Both effects have the same signs as predicted by my model. 
 To test the formal-informal wage gap predictions I follow the standard two-
step procedure in the wage inequality literature. First, I estimate the wage gap using a 
Mincer-type earnings equation for each year. In the second step, I regress the 
estimated wage gap on Brazilian and foreign tariffs in addition to year and industry 
effects. I also find strong support for my model here: a one percentage point decrease 
in own tariff increases the wage gap by 0.4 percentage point and a 1 percentage point 
decrease in the foreign tariffs decreases the gap by 0.17 percentage points.  
 The policy implications of my results are that unilateral trde liberalization 
can indeed increase job informality; however, reciprocal trade liberalization can 
mitigate this increase in informality and maybe even decrease it. 
 Chapter 3 contains the empirical assessment of the effect of trade policy on 
inter-industry wage premium for Colombia. Wage inequality can be incr ased if trade 
policy changes in a way that there is a very small effect on he wage premium of 
skilled worker intensive industries, for example. 
 The literature relating wage premium to import tariff changes has found 
mixed evidence so far. Feliciano (2001) found that the change in tariffs didn't affect 
wage premium in Mexico, and so did Pavcnik et al. (2004) for Brazil. Goldberg and 




premium for Colombia. On the other hand, Mishra and Kumar (2007) found that the 
decrease in import tariffs increased wage premium in India. 
 The existing work has ignored two key aspects. The first is whether trade 
policy changes affect differently wage premium based on industry characteristics. So, 
I use the methodology of previous studies, such as Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), to 
assess if the tariff effect is similar for manufacturing and non-manufacturing or for 
tradable and non-tradable industries. 
 The second aspect is the role of productivity in determining both the industry 
wage premium and import tariffs. Ignoring productivity can be an important source of 
endogeneity of import tariffs and is therefore the central issue that I address. Its 
omission not only generates inconsistent estimates, but from a theoretical perspective 
it also leaves room for the effect of tariffs on wages to have an ambiguous sign. This 
happens because the tariff coefficient in this case is the net result of the effect of 
tariffs on productivity (which may be positive or negative ex ante) and the effect of 
tariffs on industry rents shared with workers (which is positive ex ante). Therefore, I 
ask if trade liberalization increases or decreases the inter-industry wage premia after 
we account for the impact of productivity on trade policy. I also asess the magnitude 
of the bias in previous studies that fail to account for this source of endogeneity. 
 Using the Colombian trade liberalization (1984-1998) I find that only the 
manufacturing and the tradable industries wage premia are sensitiv  to changes in 
import tariffs. When productivity is incorporated into the estimated mo el, my results 
indicate that it is indeed an important determinant of the wage premium, and as an 




addition, the impact of trade liberalization on the manufacturing industries wage 




Chapter 1 - Trade Liberalization and Informal Labor Markets: 
Theoretical Model 
 The existence of informal labor market is a common phenomenon throughout 
the world (cf. Schneider and Enste, 2000), and its incidence varies by country and 
economic sector. In developing countries, informality takes more dramatic contours 
because informal workers are present in every sector of the economy i cluding 
manufacturing, and they also account for a significant share of the workforce1. 
 Moreover, trade liberalization episodes in Latin America were accompanied 
by a significant increase in the share of informal workers in ma ufacturing in those 
countries, as found by Perry et al. (2007). For example, in Brazil, before trade 
liberalization in 1984, the share of informal workers in manufacturing was 12%, and 
it grew to 20% in 2000, after trade liberalization. Thus, trade could affect labor 
markets not only through wages and employment but also through the quality of the 
jobs available (formal and informal).  
 Trade liberalization episodes in Latin America, contrary to what happened in 
the U.S. (cf. Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008), present the interesting feature of no 
significant reallocation of workers across industries during and after the tariffs 
decline, as found by Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) in a cross-country stud , Hanson 
and Harrison (1999) and Feliciano (2001) for Mexico, Attanasio et al. (2004) for 
Colombia, and Pavcnik et al. (2004) for Brazil. In other words, the tariff changes are 
not correlated with changes in the industry shares in total employ ent. In fact, 
                                                
1 In Brazil and Colombia household surveys indicate that at least 30% of all jobs are informal as 




Attanasio et al. (2004) found a correlation of 0.99 between 1986 and 1998 industry 
employment shares for Colombia, and for Brazil Pavcnik et al. (2004) found 
correlation of 0.96 between 1987 and 1998. 
 Since there's no industry switching and informal employment expanded, some 
of the former formal workers became informal in the same industry, as suggested by 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). They decomposed the change in the share of the 
informal workers in within and between industries variation and found that within 
industry employment changes accounted for almost all of the change in Colombia. 
For Brazil, I conducted a similar calculation and the within variation accounted for 
85% of the total variation.  
 For Latin America there’s increasing evidence that informality is related to the 
costs of having a legal contract, payroll tax being the major part of this cost. My first 
contribution is a mechanism that generates informal jobs endogenously due to the 
existence of payroll tax. Thus, I theoretically model payroll tax compliance as the key 
distinction between formal and informal workers.  
 If a firm hires a formal worker, its expected wage bill will consist of the wage, 
an ad valorem payroll tax, and a tax preparation and record keeping expenditure, 
which is a fixed per worker cost. Every firm in the economy can be audited by the 
government with a certain probability, and if the firm is caught employing informal 
workers, it will have to pay an ad valorem fine over the wages paid. Thus, the firm 





 The firms minimize their expected cost of labor by choosing formal or 
informal labor contracts. So, low wage firms find informal workers cheaper because 
the relatively high per worker tax preparation cost. By the same tok n, high wage 
firms find formal workers cheaper. Empirical evidence indicates that informal 
workers earn lower wages in relation to formal workers. This is the first time in the 
literature, in which a theoretical model is able to generate endogenously different 
formal and informal wages for identical workers2. 
 This mechanism is able to replicate other important stylized facts about 
informal labor markets. First, formal and informal workers co-exist in a range of 
different industries, so informality does not have a simple industry pecific 
explanation. Second, while the average characteristics of formal and informal workers 
differ in some industries, they are similar in others, and in fact, workers transition 
between formal and informal jobs more frequently than we would expect if 
informality were simply a function of workers characteristics.  
 The mechanism I devised need to be inserted in a trade model that have wo 
features: wage heterogeneity and within industry reallocation of employment. A 
model that satisfies theses requirements is Davis and Harrigan (2007) “Good Jobs, 
Bad Jobs” trade model. I generalize it by incorporating two types of jobs: formal and 
informal, in addition to introducing the payroll tax mechanism just described. In the 
Davis and Harrigan (2007) model firms are heterogeneous in two dimensions: wage 
(which is crucial to have payroll tax causing informality) and productivity. The 
productivity heterogeneity follows Melitz (2003) framework and it is also necessary 
                                                
22 In my model, the workers are compensated for the effort exerted, thus they are indifferent between 
jobs. It is not clear in the literature if from the workers’ perspective a formal job is always better than 




because almost all informality changes happen within the industry, and this 
framework portrays the effect of trade liberalization through the within industry 
reallocation of production. Another important result from the Melitz model is that 
only the most productive firms can overcome fixed costs to export, and these firms 
are also the largest in terms of employment, results that are supported by empirical 
evidence. So, in addition to these results, it can account for a positive correlation 
between size and formality that is strong in the data. Small firms in my model do not 
export and some of them still pay high wages and thus will prefer formal workers, 
facts that are supported by empirical evidence. 
 The comparative statics consider the effects of changes in the import tariffs 
and in the trade partners import tariffs (export barriers). The latt r has been widely 
neglected in the literature and, as we will see, it has a very important role in my 
model. The results can be summarized as follows. A decrease in th mport tariffs 
increases both the informality share and the formal-informal wage g p. On the other 
hand, decrease in foreign trade barriers decreases both the informality sh re and the 
formal-informal wage gap in a given industry. This reduction in export ba riers 
increases the demand for the currently exported goods, as a result, there is an increase 
in formal employment to cope with it. Additionally, some firms now find profitable to 
export in this case and they also increase formal employment by either hiring more 
formal workers or switching from informal to formal workers in order to export. 
Moreover, the less efficient firms exit the market and destroy b th formal and 




 In the remainder of the chapter, I present first a brief lit rature review about 
the definitions of informal labor, stylized facts and related papers. And then I discuss 
in details my theoretical model and present the comparative statics result . 
Literature Review 
Informal labor market definition and stylized facts 
 The definition of an informal labor market is closely related o what is 
considered informal or underground economy. There are two types of definitions in 
the informal economy literature. The first definition is based on the employment level 
of the economic unit, and it establishes a cutoff level below which te economic unit 
is considered informal, and its workers are considered informal too. 
 The second definition of an informal economic unit is according to its legal 
status, as is exemplified by Hernando de Soto (1989): “the informal sector is defined 
as the set of economic units that do not comply with government-imposed tax s and 
regulations”. Schneider and Enste (2000) makes it more precise by adding that 
“informal economy encompasses legal value-added creating activities which are not 
taxed or registered and where the largest part can be classified as clandestine labor, 
which means that unpaid or ‘pure' household production, voluntary nonprofit (social) 
services and criminal activities are excluded”. 
 By analogy, the legal status definition of an informal job is one in which the 
employer doesn't comply with labor regulations3, and that's the one used here. Now, 
labor laws cover several aspects of employment relationship and, as a consequence, 
                                                





partial compliance may exist. Thus, it is necessary to draw a line between formality 
and informality, which implies choosing observable aspects of the regulation that 
matters in the firm decision regarding the formality status of its employees. 
 The major reason behind the use of informal labor is explained by Portes et al. 
(1989, p.30); “the best-known economic effect of the informalization process is to 
reduce the costs of labor substantially”. Furthermore, Tokman (1992) found that the 
additional costs related to labor regulations are the most important component of the 
permanency costs in the formal sector for small firms in Latin America. Among these 
labor costs, the main distinction between a formal and an informal job in Argentina 
and in Brazil seems to be related to the costs of having a legal contract (in particular 
payroll taxes) and not related to the quality of the job per se, according to Pratap and 
Quintin (2006) and Neri (2002) respectively. Moreover, the latter presents evidence 
that some labor legislation, like workload, payment practices, and minimum wage 
seems to uniformly affect both formal and informal work relationships. An advantage 
of using payroll tax compliance is its direct observability in household surveys since 
the worker is questioned about it. Indeed, this is the widely used formal job indicator 
in the empirical literature, and it is employed for Colombia by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003), for Argentina by Pratap and Quintin (2006), and for Brazil by Neri (2002). 
 In general, payroll taxes consist of an ad valorem tax on wages, nd in some 
countries there's also a specific tax per worker. In Brazil, for example, payroll taxes 
are composed of social security contributions (currently the employer part is 20% of 
the wage paid) and other taxes not related to social security. Furthermore, firms also 




paperwork, in addition to the costs of keeping tax records. Boisvert et al. (2001) 
conducted a survey among Brazilian firms and found that these preparation costs per 
worker are between 43 and 86 dollars, or between 15 and 30% of the minimum wage 
prevailing in Brazil. 
 If the payroll taxes were social security contributions, the formal workers 
would have some utility by its payment by the employer. Brazil nd many other 
developing countries have a pay-as-you-go social security system, and in this system 
the workers tend to see the social security contributions simply as a tax that provides 
no clear benefits to them. The benefits paid are calculated by some sort of average of 
the last wages received by the worker, and these benefits will be funded by the next 
generation of workers contributions. Thus, future benefits have a very loose relation 
with the amounts contributed over time. 
 Although the lack of payroll tax compliance makes informal workers cheaper 
at a first glance, firms are subject to government audit. In Brazil there are two 
agencies that conduct such audits. The first agency, INSS, is in charge of payroll tax 
collection. In the AEPS (2005) they provide statistics regarding the number of 
establishments visited. The series started in 1992, in which 112,327 establishments 
were visited. The number of visits increased until 1994 to a level of 144,069, and then 
presented a downward trend to 89,000 establishments visited in 2001. The other 
agency, Ministry of Labor, enforces the remaining labor regulations including the 
existence of a signed labor contract. In MTB(2008) there's a report on the total 
number of firms audited. The first observation is for 1990 in which 414,875 firms 




to 384,562 in 1993, 407,732 in 1994, and 420,893 in 1995. After some oscillation 
between 350,000 and 300,000 firms audited, the number of visits ended up at 296,741 
in 2001. So, it seems that there is some variability in the enforcement intensity over 
the years. Unfortunately, there's no available data on audits disaggregated by type of 
legislation enforced and by industry. In the theoretical model developed in this paper, 
I'll use this payroll tax structure, government enforcement of such laws, and the 
workers' indifference4 regarding employer compliance with payroll taxes, in the firms 
decisions about the type of worker hired. 
 Using 1984-2001 Brazilian Household Surveys data (PNAD-Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) combined with 1991 and 2000 Brazilian 
Census data, I calculated the share of informal workers according to the social 
security criterion. There's a significant increase in informality in the manufacturing 
sector over time, whereas the share of informal workers in services sector remained 
stable. We can see from figure (1.1) that in the services sector the informality share 
was 28% in 1984 and after some oscillation it ended up at 25.5% in 2003. On the 
other hand, the informality share in manufacturing increased from 12% to 0.4% over 
the same period. So it seems that something besides a common shock acr ss 
industries affected the manufacturing sector. 
 This increase in informality could have happened because of changes i  
composition of employment across manufacturing industries with different 
informality share, or within industry changes in informality, or both. I found that 
                                                
4 It's not clear that a formal job is better than an informal job. For example, there's income tax 
incidence in the former but not in the latter. On the other hand, only a formal job comes along with 
unemployment benefits, just to mention a few differences. Since the theoretical model abstracts from 
all these features, I think it's more appropriate to assume that workers are indifferent between both 




within industry change in informality accounted for 85% of the variation in 
informality in the 1989-2001 period5. The theoretical model developed in this paper 
will allow for the existence of within industry variation in informality. 
 Table (1.1) contains some descriptive statistics of the data used her  in the 
form of industry-level statistics that were averaged over time. W  can see that 
informality is present in every industry, although the share differs by industry. The 
average characteristics of formal and informal workers (years of education, age, and 
gender) are similar in some industries like apparel and more different in industries 
like nonmetallic mineral products. 
 Furthermore, the Brazilian labor market features workers switching between 
formal and informal jobs. Table (1.2) presents evidence of this switching using data 
from the May 1996 special supplement of the PME (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego - 
Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey). In this supplement, every worker 
interviewed reported her formality status in 1991 and in 1996. We can see that 
approximately one sixth of people employed in the formal market in 1991 switched to 
the informal market in 1996. On the other hand, approximately one third of the 
workers in the informal market in 1991 migrated to the formal labor market in 1996. 
Hence, informality doesn't seem to be exclusively determined by either workers or 
industries characteristics. These facts will be taken into accunt by the theoretical 
model. 
  
                                                
5 Using a different data set, the 1987-1998 PME (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego - Brazilian Monthly 
Employment Survey), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) showed found that 88% of the variation in 




Figure 1.1 - Informality share in services and manufacturing in Brazil using 1984







Share of Informal Avg. Years of Education Avg. Age 
Avg. Share of 
Males 
Manufacturing Industry in PNAD-Census data Mean Std Dev Formal  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Wood Sawing and Wood Products  0.363 0.052 5.610 4.978 31.336 27.773 0.870 0.945 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product  0.298 0.038 5.993 4.111 32.309 26.686 0.879 0.921 
Apparel 0.269 0.043 6.734 6.212 30.843 30.265 0.223 0.192 
Coffee, Food, Beverage, Animal Feed and Tobacco  0.200 0.031 6.565 5.219 31.845 27.441 0.738 0.698 
Footwear and leather products 0.189 0.030 6.189 5.609 28.657 29.527 0.569 0.455 
Pulp and Paper Production, Paper Products, Printing 
and Publishing 0.152 0.042 8.253 7.774 31.410 28.515 0.751 0.700 
Metals Production and Processing  0.147 0.042 7.318 6.093 32.856 28.277 0.886 0.922 
Pharmaceutical, Perfume, Soap, Detergent, and Candle  0.116 0.027 9.034 8.327 32.041 30.697 0.620 0.565 
Textiles 0.115 0.029 6.732 5.704 31.230 29.670 0.588 0.477 
Plastic Products  0.100 0.024 7.095 6.498 31.148 29.017 0.647 0.689 
Machinery, Equipment and Commercial Installation 
(including parts) 0.099 0.033 7.846 6.723 33.241 31.276 0.851 0.777 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 0.088 0.029 8.524 7.972 30.896 26.706 0.712 0.751 
Rubber Products  0.082 0.036 7.146 6.236 32.350 30.277 0.851 0.750 
Non-petrochemical Chemical and Fertilizer  0.081 0.02  7.760 5.812 33.633 30.472 0.806 0.710 
Automobile, Truck and Bus (including parts) 0.068 0.019 7.909 6.941 33.287 31.069 0.873 0.835 
 






Number of people with at least 20 years 
old and working in 1991  
Employment status in May  1996 








status in May 
1991 
Formal  job 41.4% 10.1% 8.1% 1.4% 0.2% 61.2% 
Informal  job 4.9% 8.5% 2.9% 0.4% 0.1% 16.9% 
Self-employed 2.1% 2.4% 11.2% 1.8% 0.3% 17.8% 
Employers 0.3% 0.2% 0.9% 1.9% 0.1% 3.5% 
No-wage employment 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 
Non-declared 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
  Totals 48.9% 21.4% 23.4% 5.5% 0.8% 100.0% 
 






 Workers in every manufacturing industry in Brazil with the same observable 
characteristics earn different hourly wages. This wage heterogeneity can be seen as 
the residual of a Mincer type regression consisting of regressing the natural logarithm 
of hourly wages on age, age squared, years of education and a male indicator 
variable. Figure (1.2) shows the kernel density of the residuals of this regression 
estimated separately for formal and informal workers in the food and beverage 
industry in 1997 PNAD sample. This graph shows that even after contolling for 
workers' observable characteristics, there's still significant wage dispersion for both 
formal and informal workers. The graph is similar for other industrie  and years of 
my sample. This finding seems to happen in other countries (see Amiti and Davis, 
2008, for more references). Wage heterogeneity will be an important part of my 
theoretical model. 
 
Stylized facts about trade 
 Until the end of the 1980s, Brazilian trade policy was dictated by two factors: 
the import substitution policy and Balance of Payments deficits6. The former implied 
different protection across industries, in particular high import tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers on foreign goods that competed with similar domestic products. The latter 
generated large import tariffs across all industries to curb imports. Moreover, since 
Brazil is a developing country, it used article XVIII of GATT to not participate in 
earlier rounds of tariff decreases. 
  
                                                






Figure 1.2 - Kernel density of the residuals of the regression of log hourly wage on 
age, age2, years of education, black indicator, literacy indicator, male indicator, and a 
constant. The data used is from the food and beverage industry in 1997. 
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 Then in the late 1980's Brazilian trade policy started to change. During 1988 
and 1989 nominal tariffs were reduced from an extremely high levelto just high 
levels; however, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remained unchanged. Such de rease in 
nominal tariffs didn't affect the volume of imports because the NTBs were in effect, 
as documented by Kume et al. (2003). In 1990, Brazil was under a new president and 
in March of this year he reduced drastically NTBs and adopted a schedule for 
nominal tariff reductions to start in 1990 and finish in 1994. The decrease in tariffs 
was not identical across industries, as shown in Kume et al. (2003). The protection 
changed over time and across industries, in particular, some industries till receive 
extra tariff protection as decided by the Brazilian government, namely computer 
hardware and software, biotechnology, new materials, some of non-petrochemical 
chemicals, electronic appliances, machinery parts, and industries with strong 
backward and forward linkages such as automobiles. The decrease in import tariffs 
had real effects on the economy. Import penetration in manufacturing increased from 
5.7% in 1987 to 11.6% in 1998, and manufacturing goods imports increased by more 
than 200% in the 1990-1998 period. 
 Brazilian firm access to foreign markets also changed in this period due to the 
Uruguay Round tariff reductions, Mercosur customs union implementation, and 
China's ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Uruguay Round 
negotiations led to a decrease in tariffs imposed by the U.S., Japan, European Union, 
and other developed countries on several trade partners, including Brazil. The 
Mercosur customs union encompasses Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and 




the majority of goods. During the 1990s China agreed to decrease its import tariffs in 
order to join the WTO in 2001. All these trade partner tariff reductions were 
accompanied by an increase of 68% in Brazilian manufacturing goods export in the 
1990-1998 period. Table (1.3) presents the average and standard deviation of the 
Brazilian import tariffs and its trade partners import tariffs (export tariffs). 
 At the firm-level, evidence gathered by Ellery and Gomes (2007) using 
Brazilian trade data revealed that only a small percentage of Brazilian firms are 
engaged in exporting. The exporting firms are substantially larger and more 
productive than firms serving only the domestic market. These facts seem to happen 
in several countries like the U.S. (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2005) and Colombia 
(Roberts and Tybout, 1997). Although the industry classification used by Ellery and 
Gomes (2007) is slightly different from ours, the industry-level share of exporting 
firms seems to be inversely related to the share of informal workers. For example, in 
the machinery industry, about 37 percent of firms export while only nine percent of 
its workers are informal. In the apparel industry, only 12 percent of firms export but 
the informal share is about 27 percent. Menezes and Muendler (2007) found that due 
to trade liberalization, manufacturing output shifted to more productive firms in 
Brazil. Last, but not least, Muendler (2004) found that the less productive firms were 







Import Tariff Export Tariff 
Industry in PNAD-Census data Average Std. Dev Change Average Std. Dev Change 
Apparel 0.314 0.175 -0.552 0.202 0.077 -0.204 
Automobile, Truck and Bus   0.370 0.127 -0.370 0.106 0.053 -0.168 
Coffee, Food, Beverage, Animal 
Feed and Tobacco industries 0.183 0.053 -0.159 0.352 0.058 -0.212 
Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment 0.236 0.098 -0.278 0.086 0.041 -0.105 
Footwear and leather products 0.198 0.067 -0.216 0.180 0.067 -0.158 
Machinery, Equipment and 
Commercial Installation    0.210 0.089 -0.271 0.066 0.032 -0.088 
Metals Production and Processing  0.130 0.032 -0.101 0.069 0.033 -0.085 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product    0.161 0.078 -0.221 0.109 0.048 -0.12 
Non-petrochemical Chemical and 
Fertilizer   0.149 0.055 -0.190 0.073 0.028 -0.070 
Pharmaceutical, Perfume, Soap, 
Detergent, and Candle   0.151 0.091 -0.264 0.091 0.048 -0.119 
Plastic Products    0.220 0.091 -0.244 0.129 0.052 -0.129 
Pulp and Paper Production, Paper 
Products, Printing and Publishing 0.142 0.050 -0.15 0.068 0.032 -0.079 
Rubber Product    0.220 0.132 -0.351 0.085 0.040 -0.098 
Textiles 0.230 0.110 -0.400 0.156 0.063 -0.164 
Wood Sawing and Wood Products   0.148 0.054 -0.163 0.110 0.058 -0.139 
 
 
Table 1.3 – Brazilian import tariffs and export tariffs descriptive statistics for the 




 Household surveys that include questions about the employer characteristics 
reveal that not all firms offer informal jobs. Indeed, smaller firms are more likely to 
use informal workers, as found by Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) for several countries, 
and Carneiro and Henley (2001) for Brazil. All these firm level facts will be 
outcomes of the theoretical model I develop in this paper. 
 
Related Literature 
 This paper is connected to the development economics literature about 
informal labor market economy, where Rauch (1991) is an important paper because it 
is one of the first to make informal labor markets an endogenous outcome due to a 
labor market distortion: minimum wage. His model is based on Lucas (1978), in 
which agents have heterogeneous managerial ability. Depending on her managerial 
ability, the agent chooses between being an employer or an employee. The employers 
then have to decide to hire either minimum wage formal workers or lower wage 
informal, while taking into account the minimum wage enforcement rule. As a result, 
all small firms will use only informal labor. This prediction is not supported by the 
data since there are small firms that use formal employment, and minimum wage 
doesn't seem to be the reason behind labor informality in Brazil and other countries as 
discussed before. My theoretical model improves on Rauch (1991) by using a more 
realistic distortion to generate informality endogenously, which allows for formal and 





 A second connection is with the international trade literature concerned with 
the effect of trade policy changes on labor market outcomes. Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003) presents a representative firm model in which formal workers r ceive 
efficiency wages that increase according to the probability of being fired without 
justification, and informal workers that receive reservation wage nd pose no 
adjustment costs, because firms purchase a costly perfect monitoring echnology to 
use on them. So, informal workers would be hired and fired in order to accommodate 
demand fluctuations. Trade liberalization consists of mean decreasing change in the 
stochastic part of the demand curve. This change decreases the formal employment 
and therefore increases the share of informal workers.  
 Their two-step empirical strategy7 relied upon intra-industry variation in 
tariffs that happened along the trade liberalization process in Brazil and Colombia. In 
the first step, the probability of having an informal job is estima ed by a linear 
probability model for every year of the sample, controlling for the observable 
characteristics of the individuals and a set of industry affiliation indicators, which was 
intended to capture the variation in informal employment due to industry affiliation 
and not the worker characteristics. In the second step, these estimat d industry 
affiliation effects were linearly regressed on trade related measures, in addition to 
time and industry indicators. According to them, there was almost no evidence that 
trade policy changes affected the informal labor market in Brazil, nd some small 
effect for Colombia which seemed stronger before the 1994 labor market reform. 
 The reason for using informal workers in their model is at odds with labor 
regulation of several countries since there are special labor cont a ts for temporary 
                                                




workers with lower costs in relation to permanent employees. Besides using a more 
realistic reason for employing informal workers, my model improves on Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2003) by allowing firms to have different size, which is important 
because trade policy affects firms differentially according to their size, which also 
matters for informal labor markets because smaller firms are more likely to hire 
informal workers than larger firms. 
 Moreover, I have no need to resort to assumptions that firms have different 
monitoring ability because of the labor contract used. My theoretical model shows a 
clear mechanism for the effect of trade policy changes on the labor markets, and it 
also incorporates the export side of the economy. Furthermore, it presents predictions 
on a second outcome, the formal-informal wage gap. On the empirical art, I not only 
include export side variables previously ignored, but also use an instrumental variable 
approach to deal with omitted variable bias and reverse causation issues. 
 
Theoretical Model 
 My model is a generalization of Davis and Harrigan (2007), in which I 
introduce payroll taxes and two types of labor contracts: formal and informal. Their 
model combines the monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firm productivity 
model of Melitz (2003) with the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984). Firms will differ in physical productivity and in workers monitring 
productivity. The former determines the amount of output produced per worker and 
the latter determines how well the firm induces the worker to exert effort. The better 




efficiency wage models. Thus, similar workers hired by firms with similar physical 
productivity might earn different wages. 
 I decided to build on Davis and Harrigan (2007) work because its trade
predictions match several international trade stylized facts discussed before, and 
because the wage heterogeneity present in the model allows me to introduce the 
mechanism that generates formal and informal jobs endogenously. The original 
model by Davis and Harrigan (2007) becomes a particular case of mine when there is 
no payroll tax. 
 
Model set-up 
 The theoretical model is a one-sector economy composed of risk-neutral firms 
and workers. Homogeneous labor is the only factor of production. As in Davis and 
Harrigan (2007), workers have identical preferences and their utility function is 
additively separable in effort and consumption. The disutility of the former is 
measured in the same units as the wage, and the latter is given by a standard Dixit-
Stiglitz CES aggregate of differentiated goods with an associated price index P. The 
equation below shows the worker's indirect utility (ui) of being employed at firm i, in 
which wi is the wage received, e is the effort exerted (0 or 1)
8, and tr are 
governmental lump-sum transfers that are equal across all workers (employed and 
unemployed). In my theoretical model there's the assumption that the workers do not 
have any benefit from the payroll taxes and there's no unemployment benefit, so 
workers are ex-ante indifferent between a formal and an informal job. 
                                                
8The model rests on the dichotomy that workers exert or not effort, i.e. },0{ ee∈  with 0>e . For 







 This efficiency wage modeling strategy is based on Shapiro and Stiglitz model 
but Davis and Harrigan (2007) incorporated heterogeneous monitoring productivity9 
at the firm level. 
 A worker can lose her job by being caught shirking or by exogenous firm 
death, since every firm in the economy regardless of its characteristics can face an 
exogenous bad shock with probability δ10 that forces it to exit the market. Firms catch 
shirkers by monitoring all workers. The monitoring productivity (likelihood of 
catching a shirker) is a firm-specific random variable, whose inverse is mi. The 
maximum monitoring productivity corresponds to 1-δ so that the overall probability 
of being fired (exogenous firm death plus shirking motive) doesn't exceed 1. The 
inverse of the maximum monitoring productivity is m0≡(1-δ)-1 and ),[ ∞∈ oi mm . 
Contrary to what has been done before in the informal labor market literature, the 
monitoring ability in this model is independent of the type of labor contract, i.e. firm i 
has the same monitoring ability despite the use of formal or informal workers. 
 The derivation of the equation that links firm monitoring productivity to the 
wage paid consists of finding the wage that firm  needs to pay the worker to avoid 
shirking. Now, let's proceed with solution to the efficiency wage problem in a similar 
fashion to Davis and Harrigan (2007). 
 The fundamental asset equations for formally employed non-shirkers at fi m i 
and formally employed shirkers at firm i are (1.1) and (1.2) respectively, in which r is 
                                                
9It is also called monitoring ability in the efficiency wage literature. 




the discount rate, NforV ,Ei  is the value function of a formal non-shirker worker at firm i, 
SforV ,Ei . I present here the calculations for workers under formal labor conta t only, 
because the mathematical derivations from equation (1.1) to (1.6) are analogous for a 
worker under informal contract, since the former and the latter share t e same utility 
function and their supplied labor is identical. I assume that unemployed workers 
receive zero wage, either coming from a formal or informal job. Thus 
.inf UU
for
U VVV ==  An unemployed worker is able to search for formal and informal 










Sfor VVmtrwrV −+++= −δ      (1.2) 
 To avoid shirking the firm must pay a wage such that the value of shirking for 
the worker is smaller than the value of not shirking. This is translated in the non-
shirking constraint: SforNfor VV ,Ei
,
Ei ≥ . Imposing it at firm i with equality 
SforNfor VV ,Ei
,
Ei = , 
we obtain 
iUi emretrrVw )( δ+++−=        (1.3) 
 Plugging (1.3) into (1.1) 
iU
for emVV +=Ei         (1.4) 
 Analogously for the informal worker, we have 
iU emVV +=
inf
Ei         (1.5) 
 Since equations (1.4) and (1.5) reflect the required no-shirking wage choice of 
any firm i, an unemployed worker will accept the first job offer, because the flow of 




effort. Additionally, I follow Davis and Harrigan (2007) assumption thatexpected job 
tenure doesn't vary across firms since in equilibrium no one shirks in both formal and 
informal jobs. Job loss would happen only at the common exogenous rate δ of firm 
death, which is the same for firms employing formal or informal workers. 
 Let foriwf )(  be the equilibrium density of formal workers employed at firm i. 
The average lifetime utility of a formally employed non-shirker is given by forEV . 
Similarly, let forw  and form  be the average formal wage and the average monitoring 
ability for formal workers respectively. 
diwfVV fori
forfor
E )(Ei∫≡        (1.6) 
 The benefits flow of being unemployed consists entirely of the expected 
capital gain from re-employment as shown below, in which  a  is the instantaneous 







     (1.7) 
 Taking averages over i from equation (1.4) for formal workers and from 
equation (1.5) for informal workers, we obtain 




E =−=−       (1.8) 
 Substituting (1.8) into (1.7) 
trmeamearV forforU ++=
infinf
      (1.9) 
 Let L be the total size of the labor force, infL  be the number of workers in 
informal jobs, forL  be the number of workers in formal jobs, U be the total number of 
unemployed, and u be the unemployment rate, defined as L




 Since infL  and forL  are endogenously determined in equilibrium, fora  and 
infa  can be examined in terms of the steady state, by the fact th t inflows and 
outflows from unemployment must be equal. In steady state, only exogenous 








≡ϒ−ϒ== δδ      (1.10) 
))(1( ULLUa forfor −ϒ−== δδ       (1.11) 
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])1([ inf δδ +++
−
ϒ+ϒ−=   
 Let m  be the average im , ϒ+ϒ−=
inf)1( mmm for , and following Melitz 
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       (1.14) 
 Now, we're ready to solve for ),( ii muw . Solving for m  in equation (1.14), 
and plugging it into equation (1.13), 
ii emeueww δ++−−= )1)((        (1.15) 




which is defined as the nummeraire of the economy. 
1)1)(( 0 ≡++−−= emeuewwL δ       (1.16) 
 Plugging (1.16) into (1.15), we obtain Davis and Harrigan equation 1.11, 
which is equation (1.17) in this paper. This equation links the firm monitoring ability 
to the wage paid in a one-to-one positive relationship. 
)(1 0mmew ii −+= δ         (1.17) 
 On the production side, every firm has to pay a once and for all entry fixed 
cost, fe units of labor, to enter the market and know its drawing of monitoring 
productivity and physical productivity ( iim ϕ, ). If the firm decides to stay in the 
market and produce, it then incurs a fixed cost of f units of labor every period it 
operates, and a variable cost composed of labor used in activities that varies in 
amount according to the output (q). 
 The workers in the variable activity cost can be hired using formal or informal 
labor contracts. In both contracts the firm has to pay the efficiency wage ( iw ), but 
only firms offering formal contracts have to pay payroll taxes composed of a specific 
tax per worker (θ ) and an ad valorem tax (t) on wage. Alternatively, θ  can be 
interpreted as the per worker costs of calculating and preparing the tax forms11. The 
expected wage bill (ib ) for a formal worker is 
tTTwb i
for
i +≡+= 1  ;θ        (1.18) 
 Under the informal labor contract, firm i does not comply with payroll taxes. 
All firms may be audited by the government with a probability .ζ  If a firm is caught 
                                                
11In this case, I would have to add a constant returns to scale sector to produce such accounting 




using informal labor, it will be subject to an d valorem fine of η  of the wage paid to 
each informal worker. The payroll taxes and fines collected ar  used in lump-sum 
transfers to all workers, employed and unemployed, in the economy. The expected 
informal worker wage bill is 
)1(  ;inf ηζλλ +≡= ii wb        (1.19) 
 Following Davis and Harrigan (2007), all firms pay the same wage for 
workers in the fixed costs activities12. Without loss of generality I'll fix a wage of 1 
for these workers, and there is no incidence of payroll taxes of any sort on it. These 
fixed cost activities can also be interpreted as a homogeneous intermediate input 
produced under constant returns to scale. 
 The physical labor demand, ),( iib ϕλ , is given by equation (1.20); in which 
the first term in the right-hand side is the per period fixed cost and the last term of the 










),( +=λ        (1.20) 
 The firm productivity13 (s) is a random variable defined as the output 
produced by dollar spent on the wage bill, i.e. iii bs /ϕ≡ , which is the inverse of the 
marginal cost, and is a continuous function in ( iim ϕ, ). 
Autarky 
 From the consumer expenditure minimization problem, the demand curve for 
                                                
12It is crucial to the model that the amount paid on each type of fixed cost be the same for all firms, 
otherwise there's no guarantee of the existence of g neral equilibrium in the model. 
13Davis and Harrigan (2007) defined a similar variable, iii wz /ϕ≡ , which was the inverse of the 




firm i output that is priced pi is  given by equation (1.21), in which Q is the aggregate 
production level of the economy, )1,0(∈ρ  is the parameter of the CES part of the 
worker utility, like in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and ≡σ 1)1( 1 >− −ρ  is the elasticity 









=          (1.21) 
 Firm i maximizes its profit, equation (1.22), by choosing the price pi given by 















==         (1.23) 
 Firm i chooses to hire formal employees for its variable cost activities if and 
only if expected profit ( foriπ ) of employing them is larger than the expected profit 
)( infiπ  of employing informal workers. Since labor is homogeneous, the only 
difference between the two types of workers resides on the wagbill. Thus, firms will 
choose the cheapest labor contract, and in equilibrium, firms won't hire both formal 
and informal workers. Firm i will hire only formal workers if infi
for
i bb < , hereafter 
called a formal firm. Otherwise firms will hire only informal workers and will be 
called an informal firm. This mechanism used to generate informal jobs would also 
work in other models that display wage heterogeneity. Notice that we can express this 












wi         (1.24) 









       (1.25) 
 Hence, in autarky the firm monitoring productivity will determine the type of 
labor contract it offers. In order to have both formal and informal jobs in the 
economy, I need the technical assumptions of t>ηζ  and T−> λθ , which guarantee 
the existence of an interval of δ−> 1
1
im  in which the expected wage bill of an informal 
worker is smaller than the expected wage bill of a formal worker. 
 In figure (1.3), both the formal and informal expected wage bill functio s are 
plotted. We can see that },min{ infi
for
ii bbb =  is a continuous and bijective function of 
im . Additionally, informal jobs will be generated by low wage firms. The lowest 
wage received by a worker employed in variable cost activity will be Lw , i.e. 1, and 
the respective wage bill (also the lowest) will be λ, since this worker will have an 
informal job. 
 The wage cutoff, χ, is decreasing in λ, as a consequence it is also decreasing 
in η and ζ, which means that either an increase in the fine or an increase in th  
likelihood of an audit will decrease the cutoff and therefore the set of firms offering 
informal labor contracts gets smaller, implying a decrease in the informality share. On 
the other hand, an increase in either one of the payroll taxes leads to n increase in χ, 
enlarging the set of firms offering informal labor contracts. If the enforcement 




These properties are in line with findings that both taxation and its enforcement are 
determinants of informal economy (cf. Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
 The fixed cost activity implies that in equilibrium not all firms will be 
producing because some firms will make negative profits and exit the market as soon 
as they observe their draw of m and ϕ. The active firms are the ones with productivity 
above the threshold ∗s , i.e. they make at least zero profit. The cumulative distribution 
function of si is ]Pr[)( sSsG ≤≡  and its density is given by g(s). The equilibrium 
density of firms with positive output in the autarkic economy is defined by: 








 Let M be the mass of firms, and the number of firms at any given level of s is 
Mg(s), as a consequence, the number of surviving firms is given by )(sMµ . The 
variable s~  is a measure of aggregate inverse marginal costs, and it will be finite if the 













       (1.26) 
 To determine ∗s  we use two equations relating average profits of the 
successful entrant (π ) and the productivity of the marginal entrant (∗s ). The first 
equation is what Melitz (2003) called the free entry condition (FE), given by equation 
(1.27), which states that from an unbounded set of x ante identical firms, a sufficient 








Figure 1.3 - Wage (wi) and expected wage bill (bi) for formal and informal labor 
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π         (1.27) 
 The other condition is the zero cutoff productivity (ZCP), given by equation 
(1.28), which requires that the marginal entrant firms (the less productive active 
firms) have variable profits (vπ ) equal to the per period fixed cost of production. 





















 The FE and ZCP equations fully determine ∗s , and, as proven in Melitz 
(2003) a unique solution exists. The next step is to solve for the model scal , namely 
the mass of firms, M, the average wage, ,w  the unemployment rate, u, and the 
government transfers, tr. The first equation needed is the labor market clearing 
equation. The labor force is divided into five elements, namely the unemployed (U), 
workers in fixed entry cost sector (Le), workers in per-period fixed cost activities 
(Lfc), formal workers in variable cost activities (
for
vL ), and informal workers in 





vfce LLLLUL ++++=        (1.29) 
 In a steady state, the mass of active firms doesn't change, so the mass of 
entrants should be enough to replace the mass of firms that received a bad shock and 
exited the market. The amount of labor used in the entry fixed cost activity is 




From the joint distribution of ( ii m,ϕ ), parameters θ, λ, T, and the equilibrium ,
∗s  we 
can construct the equilibrium joint density of productivity and wage bill, ),( ii bϕφ . 
The total employment in variable costs is given by the sum of the formal workers       
( forvL ) and informal workers (Lv
inf























































































)1( δ       (1.30) 
 The total wages paid by each firm is given by its employment level times the 

















sw )()(),( ==λ      (1.31) 
 Then, we have to sum the wages paid over all active firmsto obtain the total 
amount paid to variable cost activity workers (vtwp ). The total payments to labor 
must also include payments to workers in the fixed cost activities. To obtain the 
average wage (w ) we have to divide the total wages paid by the number of employed 












 All the taxes and fines collected are returned in a lump-sum to all individuals 






for infinf)( ηζθ ++
=       (1.33) 
 And from the efficiency wage problem, we obtain the relation between the 








        (1.34) 
 The proof of equilibrium existence is similar to Davis and Harrig n (2007) 
and is omitted here. A solution of this system can be obtained by isolating MLu)1(
1
−  on 
equation (1.30) and plugging it in equation (1.32) to obtain .w  Then, with w  and 
equation (1.34) we can calculate u. To obtain M we can plug u into equation (1.30). 
Finally, tr can be solved for by plugging M into equation (1.33). 
 
Open economy 
 The world economy is composed by two identical countries14. Trade costs 
consist of a per period fixed cost of xf  units of labor
15 and an iceberg variable export 
cost, in which the firm ships τ units (τ > 1) and 1 unit arrives. The variable export 
cost may include transportation costs and trade partner import tariffs, for example. In 
order to have some firms exporting and others not, I assume the sufficient condition 
of ff x > , which is also used in Baldwin (2005). An explanation suggested by him is 
the existence of standards and regulations, also called technical barriers to trade 
                                                
14The results presented here are easily generalized for n, n+1>2, symmetric countries. 
15In a similar fashion to the per period fixed cost of production, I assume that firms a wage of 1 to 




(TBTs), which increase the fixed cost for exported units. The European Union 
standards are examples of TBTs. A by-product of this assumption is that every 
exporting firm will also serve the domestic market. 
 The home and foreign governments monitor international trade by collecting 
information on who exports, quantity exported and prices, item description, and 
destination. This information can be matched to the firm payroll taxes data. So, if 
firm i exports and there's no payroll taxes paid, probability of enforcement for that 
firm (ζ) will be one, and then it's not profitable for the firm to have informal workers 
and export. If a firm is an exporter, government will also kn w that it serves domestic 
market and its employment level. Therefore, the possibility of employing formal 
workers in the export orders and informal in domestic orders is ruled out. But, 
informal firms serving domestic markets have the choice of becoming an exporter by 
paying payroll taxes on all variable cost activity workers, plus the per period export 
fixed cost. Thus, this assumption generates the fact that the larg r the share of 
exporting firms, the smaller the informality share. 
 The payroll tax enforcement rule can be specified in a different fashion by 
making the audit likelihood an increasing function of the firm employment level. 
Since exporters are also large firms, a large share of exporting firms in a given 
industry implies a smaller informality share. Since the comparative statics using both 
types of enforcement rules are similar, I'll use the first specification for sake of 
simplicity. 









from serving domestic and foreign markets respectively. It means that the firm can 
choose between staying out of the market, producing for domestic consumers using 
informal workers, producing for domestic consumers using formal workers, or 
producing for domestic and foreign consumers using formal workers. The profit from 
serving the foreign market has to take into account the iceberg export variable cost, τ
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 The entry cutoff can be similarly defined as }.0)(:inf{ >=∗ sssopen π  The 
export cutoff can be defined as  
} for   and ,for  :{inf inf,,,,,,,
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 The first term applies to the firms whose monitoring productivity mplies that 
formal workers are always cheaper. The second term refers to firms that in autarky 
would hire only informal workers, but now they have the option to comply with 
payroll taxes in order to have access to foreign markets. Figure (1.4) summarizes 
some features of my model on the expected wage bill-productivity space. The first 
feature is the horizontal line at λχ=ib . Every firm with λχ≥ib  (above the line) 
offers only formal labor contracts, and if λχ<ib  (below the line) firms may offer 
formal or informal labor contracts. The productivity, s, can be represented as a ray 




portraying which firms are active in the economy. So, every firm located on the left 
of the ∗opens   ray will exit the market as soon as they learn their pair ( iim ϕ, ), and the 
active firms will be on the right side of it. 
 Intuitively, the firms that will profit by becoming formal and exporting are the 
ones whose marginal cost will end up smaller than the marginal cost cut off for export 
even after adjusting bi for payroll taxes. Since the difference between informal and 
formal wage bill decreases in wi, the borderline between the firms that will become 
formal and export and the ones that will remain informal won't be a ray starting at the 
origin, i.e. it has an intercept different from the si lines. This borderline is the segment 
AB depicted in figure (1.4). The line that contains the AB segment is described by 
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 On figure (1.4), the informal firms are the ones located inside the polygon 
ABCD. The exporters are located to the right of ∗ forxs , . We can see that in the open 
economy the exporters are firms with larger size and productivity. The firms 
employing informal workers are small firms and there are also small firms hiring 
formal workers. 
 The economy structure is determined by the equilibrium values of ∗opens , 
∗
forxs , , 
and their counterparts in the foreign economy. In steady state equilibrium the density 
of active firms is defined by: 













Figure 1.4 - Physical productivity (ϕi) and expected wage bill (bi) space and firms’ 
choice of labor contracts and markets served in an ope  economy. 
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 The probability of being an exporter is given by )Pr(export  which is the 


































































   (1.38) 
 The mass of exporter firms is given by MortM x )Pr(exp= . The computation 
of s~  is as before, equation (1.26), but now under the new cut off, )(~ ∗openss . The 
aggregate measure of productivity for exporters will be xs
~ . The overall average 
across all domestic firms of combined profit π (earned from both domestic and 
export sales) is given by 
)~()(expPr)~( xxd sorts πππ +=       (1.39) 
 The zero cutoff productivity (ZCP) equation is now built taking into account 
the exporters profits from foreign market, as shown in equation (1.40). 
)()(expPr)( ,





















 We obtain from the ratio of the zero profit conditions, where )(srd  and )(srx  
are the domestic and foreign sales revenue, a relation between the entry cutoff in the 
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forx        (1.42) 
 The free-entry condition (FE) equation is like befor , in steady state a 
sufficient mass of firms enters so that the average profits from entry equal the fixed 







π         (1.43) 
 From the open economy ZCP and FE relations, equations (1.40) and (1.43), 
we obtain a system for home and foreign equations that determines in equilibrium the 
pair ( ∗opens , 
foreign
opens





∗  are functions of foreignopens
,∗  
and ∗opens  respectively, as shown by equations (1.41) and (1.42). Following Melitz 


























     (1.44)
 
 A solution to this system is a pair of (∗opens , 
foreign
opens
,∗ ) such that 021 == FF . 
This solution can be represented in the foreignopenopen ss
,∗∗ ×  space by the intersection of the 
01 =F  and  02 =F  schedules. 
Proposition 1.  There exists a solution to the system (1.44) and it is unique. 




































































































































































































, and a similar condition holds for the 
foreign country, as a consequence, we have 0 < ∆  1, which implies that the 
schedules intersect each other, i.e. the equilibrium exists, and the intersection is 
unique. These last two facts are due to the monotonici y of the (.)j  function as shown 
in Melitz (2003).   
 To solve for the model scale, we need the labor market clearing equation, 
which now has to include the number of workers employed in the export fixed cost 
activity ( xL , xxx fML = ). The number of workers employed in the variable cost 
activity, Viλ , for firm i is given by equation (1.45), where the first term corresponds 
to the number of workers employed by an exporting frm that would hire informal 
workers in autarky; the second term corresponds to an exporting firm that would hire 
formal workers anyway. The last term refers to the firms that serve only the domestic 
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λ    (1.45) 
 With each firm level of employment in the variable cost activity, we can 
calculate the overall demand for workers in the variable cost activity. The labor 

















)(expPr)1( δ    (1.46) 
 The equation (1.47) is the average wage (w ) that is obtained by adding the 
fixed cost activity workers wage bill to the variable cost activity total wage, which 


















δ    (1.47) 
 The last two equations needed are the relation between unemployment and 
average wage, equation (1.33), and the equation (1.34) that describes the government 
transfers. The procedure to solve for M, u, w , and tr is similar to the closed economy 
case and the proof of equilibrium existence is again similar to Davis and Harrigan 
(2007), and omitted here. 
Comparative Statics 
 The effect of trade policy changes in the informal labor markets is assessed in 
this paper by the impact of changes in foreign and home country import tariffs, τ and 
τforeign respectively, on the share of informal workers ando  the formal-informal wage 
















      (1.48) 
 The effect of a change in τ on the informality share is given by equation 
(1.49). We can see that M, P, and Q can be factored out when calculating the s are, 
because they are common factors in forVL  and in 
inf
vL . Thus, these terms are crossed 
out, so the share is a function of the structure of the economy (∗opens  and 
∗
forxs , ) and 
































   (1.49) 
 The first term of the right-hand side is positive. A decrease in the export 
barriers leads to an increase in demand due to a reduction in the price paid by foreign 
consumers. The current exporters will hire more formal workers to cope with it. Then, 
the share of informal workers decreases. 
 The second term on the right-hand side is positive. A decrease in τ decreases 
the export cutoff, ∗ forxs , , and some domestic firms will enter the foreign market. These 
new exporters will increase their formal employment to increase production and in 
some cases they will switch from informal to formal workers in order to export. As a 
result, the informal share decreases. 
 The third term represents the effect of the firms exiting the market and it is a 
product of two effects. The first is that a decrease in marginal cost entry cutoff, ∗opens  
ray rotates to the right in figure (1.4), makes the highest marginal cost active formal 
and informal firms exit the market. Hence the number of formal and informal jobs 




negative because a decrease in export variable costs makes the foreign market more 
attractive for domestic firms by increasing their exp cted profits. As a consequence, a 
decrease in the marginal cost entry cutoff (an increase in ∗opens ) is needed to re-
establish expected zero profits for new entrants. 
 Informality share is affected by changes in  foreignτ  by the two channels 































    (1.50) 
 The first channel (term) is positive and it is theeffect on the exporters that are 
at the margin. A decrease in foreignτ  increases foreignopens
,∗  by the mechanism described 
before, and through equation (1.40), it increases th  domestic export cutoff, ∗ forxs , . As 
a consequence, some firms exit the foreign market and fire formal workers. Among 
these firms, the ones with wi < χ will switch back to informal workers. The second 
channel is the effect of foreignτ  changes on the domestic market entry cutoff. A 
decrease in foreignτ  reduces ∗opens  because the increase in the domestic export cutoff 
decrease the overall expected profits and then ∗opens has to decrease to meet the zero 
profit condition. 
 The sign of ∗∂
∂
opens
share  depends on the joint density of wages and physical 
productivity, Ψ(wi,φi), since there is a one-to-one relationship between wages (w) and 
monitoring ability (m), as dictated by equation (1.17). All else equal, if there's more 
informal firms in the ∗opens  ray, a rotation to the right (increase in 
∗
opens ) would reduce 




share would decrease. Now, changes in the payroll taxes and enforcement parameters 
would alter the formal-informal wage cutoff, χ. All else equal, a higher χ implies a 
larger number of informal firms in the ∗opens  ray, and as explained before, an increase 
in ∗opens  would decrease the informal share. On the other hand,  lower χ could make 
the informal share increase after an increase in ∗opens . 
 A conservative, approach in specifying sufficient conditions to circumvent 
this sign indeterminacy is imposing conditions that are likely to hold in real life, and 
when there's no such guidance, opt for restrictions that seem plausible. 
 The partial derivatives of τ and τforeign on the variables describing the economy 
structure are calculating using the Cramér rule. The first step is to find the sign of the 
Jacobean matrix of the system of equations that describ  the economy structure, 
which is proved in Lemma 1 to be positive. 
Lemma 1. The determinant of the Jacobean matrix of the system (1.44) is positive. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 The next step is finding the signs of the partial derivatives of ∗opens  and 
∗
forxs ,
with respect to τ and τforeign, which are done in Lemma 2 and 3 respectively. 
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Proof. See Appendix. 































Proof. See Appendix. 
 Now, in Proposition2 we can calculate the model prdictions about the share 




Proposition 2. If the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold, a decrease inτ implies a 
decrease in the informal share ( foreignd
dshare
ττ




dshare  < 0). 
1
1
  (S4)  ;3  (S3)  ;0
),(























ww x  
Proof. See Appendix. 











share  negative (positive) term. In other words, the amount of workers affected by 
changes in the export side of the economy is large enough to overcome what happens 
in the import side of the economy.  
 Condition (S1) imply that given a level of expected wage bill, it's more likely 
to find a firm with low physical productivity than with high physical productivity, 
which is what is found in the empirical literature about productivity and firm size, as 
discussed in Melitz (2003). Condition (S2) states that given a level of physical 
productivity, a low-wage firm is more likely to exist than a high-wage firm. Both 
conditions (S1) and (S2) are met by the widely used Pareto distribution, for example.  
 Condition (S3) is reasonable since Broda et al. (2008) using trade data at HS-4 
level of aggregation estimated the elasticity of substitution and found a median above 
3 for 15 developing countries, among them several in Latin America. Notice that my 
model is set in a much more disaggregated level, so we should expect these 




 The last condition, (S4), means that in order to have the proposition results we 
need the informal labor market to have at least a certain size. And this condition is 
likely to be met as long as xf  is not much larger than f. 
 The effect of a symmetric decrease in trade variable cost would be given by 









+=       (1.54) 
 Notice again that the sign of τd
dshare is indeterminate, unless we impose the 
same sufficiency conditions as done before. 
Proposition 3. A symmetric decrease in τ and foreignτ  decreases the share of informal 
workers if conditions (S1)-(S4) are met. 




larger in absolute value than the terms in 
ττ
foreignd
dshare . The sufficiency assumptions are the 
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 The formal-informal wage gap is defined as the difference between average 
formal wage ( forw ) and average informal wage (infw ), as shown by equation (1.55). 
Again, only the workers employed in variable cost ac ivities are considered in 
calculations, and only the structure of the economy, and not its scale, is what matters 


















 The effect of τ and τforeign on the formal-informal wage gap also suffers from 
the sign ambiguity, but now not only through the number of formal and informal 
workers but also through the total wages paid to formal and informal workers. Thus 
the assumptions made here are somewhat similar to the ones used in the informal 
share propositions, but they're now tailored to a specific joint density of (ϕ,m) or 
(ϕ,w). 
Proposition 4. If conditions (W1)-(W3) hold, a decrease in τ decreases the formal-




> 0) and a decrease in foreignτ  increases the formal-
informal wage gap (
ττ
foreignd
dwagegap < 0). 
(W1) ϕ  and w are independently Pareto distributed in which  1k  , 2k  > σ  > 2 are 




































Proof. See Appendix.  
 Assumption (W1) is a particular case of assumptions (S1) and (S2) used 
before, and the conditions on 1k and 2k  are needed for the existence of first moments 
of both ϕ  and w. The last two conditions, (W2) and (W3), are used to guarantee that 
a decrease in total wage paid to informal workers due to a change in ∗ forxs ,  is smaller 
than the induced variation in the number of informal workers times the average wage. 
In other words, the informal jobs destroyed are the on s with wages below the 
informal average wage. 













+=      (1.56) 
Proposition 5. A symmetric decrease in τ  and in foreignτ  decrease the formal-
informal wage gap ( 0<τd
dwagegap ) if conditions (W1)-(W3) hold. 

















From the lemmas (5), (6) and (7) we can see that the derivatives with respect to τ are 
larger than the ones with respect to foreignτ .   
 Under some plausible assumptions on the joint distribution of physical and 
monitoring productivities and on the payroll tax and enforcement parameters, the 
model predictions are that a decrease in home import tariffs increases both the 
informality share and the formal-informal wage gap in home whereas a decrease in 
foreign tariffs has the opposite effect.  
Final Remarks 
 
 In this chapter I presented a novel theoretical model in which trade policy 
changes do affect informal labor markets, which encompasses a significant amount of 
workers in developing countries. The first novel feature of my theoretical model is 
that informal labor markets arise endogenously due to payroll taxes, which has been 
identified as the most important reason for informality. My model is able to generate 




informality is not industry specific, and it doesn’t require workers to be 
heterogeneous, i.e. informality is not a function of the workers characteristics. 
Moreover, the theoretical model displays a positive correlation between size and 
formality, and small firms do not export and do notall hire informal workers, in fact, 
the high wage small firms prefer formal workers, facts that are supported by empirical 
evidence. 
 Changes in trade policy impact two labor market ouc mes related to 
informality: the share of informal workers and formal-informal wage gap at the 
industry level. This impact works through affecting the distribution of active and 
exporting firms and the quantity produced by each firm. The trade policy instruments 
considered are import tariffs and trade partner import tariff (export barriers).  
 From the comparative statics of the model, a decrease in import tariffs leads to 
an increase in the share of informal workers and in the formal-informal wage gap. A 
reduction in export barriers decreases both the informality share and the wage gap. 
The latter is another novel feature of my model that has very important implications. 
We can see that the effect of the export barrier has an opposite effect to the import 
barriers. Therefore, if both effects have similar magnitudes but opposite directions, 
when the effects of trade liberalization on either the informality share or the wage gap 





Chapter 2 - Trade Liberalization and Informal Labor Markets: 
Empirical Assessment 
 
 The comparative statics of my theoretical model provide testable predictions 
of the effects of import tariffs and export barriers on the share of informal workers 
and on the formal-informal wage gap. I use the 1989-2001 Brazilian trade 
liberalization to estimate theses effects. 
 The Brazilian trade liberalization episode is a very good candidate for 
empirical investigation for several reasons. First, informal workers are clearly and 
directly identified in the data as the individuals whose employers do not pay payroll 
taxes. In addition, Brazil went through a major decrease in import tariffs that started 
in 1989. Later, in the 1990s, its trade partners decreased their import tariffs on 
Brazilian goods. As a result, manufacturing imports increased by more than 200% 
and so did exports by 68%. Finally, Brazilian labor institutions didn't change in this 
period, which is a nice feature since several countries that went on a trade 
liberalization program also reformed labor regulations. 
 The data used consists of industry level Brazilian and foreign tariffs, and 
Brazilian household surveys in the form of repeated cross-sections between 1989 and 
2001. The surveys contain workers demographic and employment characteristics 
including industry affiliation and informality status. 
 I assessed the effect of Brazilian and foreign tariffs on the industry-level share 
of informal workers by estimating a linear probability model using worker level data, 
in which the dependent variable is the informality status indicator. Given the 




workers observable characteristics available in the data. My findings indicate that 
reducing within industry Brazilian import tariff by a percentage point increased 
informal share by 0.8 percentage points. On the other hand, a percentage point 
decrease in foreign tariff reduces informality by 0.4 percentage points. Both effects 
have the same signs as predicted by my model, and their magnitudes are plausible. 
 To test the formal-informal wage gap predictions I follow the standard two-
step procedure in the wage inequality literature. In the first step, I estimate a Mincer-
type earnings equation for each year of the sample, wh re the industry-level formal-
informal gap is given by the estimated coefficient of he interaction between formality 
indicator and the industry affiliation indicator. In the second step, the estimated wage 
gap is regressed on Brazilian and foreign tariffs in addition to year and industry 
effects. I also find strong support for my model here: a one percentage point decrease 
in own tariff increases the wage gap by 0.4 percentage point and a 1 percentage point 
decrease in the foreign tariffs decreases the gap by 0.17 percentage points.  
 An important finding is that the Brazilian import tariff is endogenous with 
respect to informal share and formal-informal wage gap. To circumvent this problem, 
I use an instrumental variable approach, and the instrument used is the liberalization 
path of a similar country. 
 Last, but not least, my findings are not robust to the omission of foreign tariffs 
from the estimated model. This fact highlights the importance of not neglecting this 





Description of the data 
Workers data 
 It is not easy to obtain data about informal labor c ntracts because of their 
illegal nature. However, in Brazil there are annual cross-section household surveys 
that ask the workers questions about their job formality status in addition to questions 
about demographic and employment characteristics. These surveys are called PNAD-
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios and are conducted by the IBGE-
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Bureau of Geography and 
Statistics). They cover the whole country except rural areas of the Northern Region 
(less than 5% of Brazilian population and no manufact ring). PNAD is not conducted 
in the years in which there's census survey (1991 and 2000) and it was not conducted 
in 1994. To fill the gap for 1991 and 2000, I used the Brazilian census microdata 
sample for 1991 and 2000, which asks the same questions as PNAD. The census data 
came from IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center, 2007). The data used 
in this paper covers from 1989 to 2001, but excludes 1994. 
 There are two important issues regarding the incentives the workers have to 
reveal the truth in the survey informality status questions. The first is that the 
information provided by the interviewed person is confidential and according to 
Brazilian Law, it can't be used as evidence in court. Furthermore, in Brazil the 
informal worker suffers no fine, imprisonment or any other penalty when caught by 
the authorities, only the employer suffers penalties. The second issue is that the 
worker knows about her informal status, i.e. it is common knowledge when the 




employee pays a share of the social security contribution, which is deducted from her 
wage. The work card is signed by the employer during the hiring process and then 
returned to the worker, who uses it as a proof of employment. 
 The workers characteristics used in this paper are ag , gender, years of 
education, industry affiliation, monthly wage, hours usually worked in a week, 
informality status according to employer social security contributions. I discarded all 
observations with missing data in any of the before mentioned variables. My sample 
includes only employees, so employers and self-employed people are excluded from 
my sample. I consider only workers between 15 and 65 years-of-age. This sample cut 
was chosen to avoid workers that are informal for being too young to be a formal 
worker (must be at least 14 years-of-age) and people receiving social security benefits 
and as a consequence are not authorized to work formally (older than 65 years-of-
age). When a worker had multiple jobs, I considered only the main or primary job 
hourly wage (built as the monthly wage divided by four times the hours worked per 
week). The total number of observations is 767,087. 
 The industry aggregation level used in this paper is dictated by PNAD 
industry classification, which consists of 16 manufacturing industries, but is not as 
coarse as the 2-digit ISIC classification, and is not as disaggregated as the 3-digit 
ISIC. The industry classification is depicted on table (2.1) with their equivalence to 
IBGE Nível 50 industry classification, which is used in Brazilian import tariffs, and 3-




Industry in PNAD-Census data 
IBGE 
Nível50 ISIC3 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product    4 361-2,369 
Metals Production and Processing  5,6,7 371-2,381 
Machinery, Equipment and Commercial Installation (including parts) 8 382 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 10,11 383 
Automobile, Truck and Bus    (including parts) 12,13 384 
Wood Sawing and Wood Products   14 121-2,331-2 
Pulp and Paper Production, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 15 341-2 
Rubber Product    16 355 
Non-petrochemical Chemical and Fertilizer   17,19 351 
Pharmaceutical, Perfume, Soap, Detergent, and Candle   20 352 
Plastic Products    21 356 
Textiles 22 321 
Apparel 23 322 
Footwear and leather products 24 323-4 
Coffee, Food, Beverage, Animal Feed and Tobacco industries 25 to 31 311 to 314 
 
Table 2.1 – Equivalence among PNAD/Census manufacturing industry classification 




 The informality indicator constructed is based on the social security 
contribution status, i.e. the informal variable is "1" if the worker employer doesn't pay 
social security contributions, and "0" otherwise. The share of informal worker in 
industry i and year t according to each criterion consists of the weightd average of 
the informality indicator, and the weights are the sample weights provided by PNAD-
Census. 
 The job informality questions have very few missing observations that 
account for three tenths of a percentage point in each year of the sample. However, 
the missing observations tend to be concentrated in only one industry: petroleum 
refining and petrochemicals, in which at least ten p rcent of observations are missing 
every year. Thus, I decided to exclude this sector from my analysis because I do not 
believe it would cause any impact in the results since it is a sector that employs a 
small number of workers and most of it is composed by government owned firms. 
 The formal-informal wage gap of industry i in year t consists of the difference 
between the average formal wage and the average informal wage. So, the wage gap 
measured here is the difference in the hourly wage that can be attributed to the 
formality status, i.e. after we control for worker observable characteristics that can 
also influence the wage such as education and experi nc , gender, color and industry 
affiliation. Experience is not observable in our data, thus I adopt the standard solution 
in the literature that is control for the age and its square. To obtain the wage gap we 
need to estimate equation (2.1) by weighted OLS for every year in my data set, using 



















in which jkage  is the age in years of person k working in industry j, male is an 
indicator if person k is a male, educ is the number of years of formal schooling, black 
is an indicator if person k is black, jindustry  is a vector of industry affiliation 
indicators, and informaljk is an indicator if person k works under an informal labor 
contract in industry j. 
 The estimated wage gap is given by the vector of coe fi ients 2γ , and it can 
be interpreted as the average percentage increase in th  wage that a worker would 
receive by having a formal instead of an informal contract. These coefficients and 
their estimated standard errors are normalized by the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 
(1997) two-step restricted least square procedure. Th  inverse of these standard error 
estimates will be used as weights when wage gap is the dependent variable. 
 Table (2.2) reports the estimated coefficients for selected years of the sample. 
The results indicate that wages are increasing in ae and in years of education. Males 
receive wages at least 28 percent higher than females. Formal workers in the apparel 
industry receive a wage 24 percent higher than informal workers in 1987 for example. 
The wage gap estimated coefficients are jointly statistically significant for all years, 




Dependent Variable : log(hourly wage) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal*apparel 0.243*** 0.290*** 0.170*** 0.126*** 
(0.061) (0.040) (0.051) (0.036) 
Formal*metal production 0.581*** 0.537*** 0.361*** 0.366*** 
(0.080) (0.066) (0.042) (0.040) 
Age 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.305*** 0.328*** 0.319*** 0.279*** 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
Black -0.192*** -0.105*** -0.156*** -0.106*** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) 
Years of education 0.088*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 13271 12816 12951 13639 
R-squared 0.435 0.498 0.512 0.467 
Year 1989 1993 1997 2001 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample weights used. 
Industry effects and their interaction with formal indicator included in all regressions. 
 





 The data about Brazilian import tariffs16 at Nível 50 aggregation comes from 
Kume et al. (2003). The data is aggregated by industry value-added, and it encompass 
the 1987-2001 period. I further aggregated the tariffs into my 15 manufacturing 
industries, using the industry value added as Kume et al. (2003). 
 The tariffs faced by Brazilian exporters vary according to each trade partner. 
Data availability constrained the choice of partners used in the empirical analysis, 
which are Argentina, China, Japan, USA, France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Belgium-Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. They account for more than 
60 % of all Brazilian exports in the 1989-2001 period. 
 For every country, except Argentina, data at 3-digit ISIC level was obtained 
from the Trade, Production, and Protection 1974-2006 by Nicita and Olarreaga 
(2006), from which I used the mfnsavgtar __  series that is the simple average tariff 
rate in percentage points that must be paid for the good at the border of the importing 
country by a most favored nation (MFN). This tariff measure can be understood as an 
upper bound of the tariffs imposed on Brazilian products. Each partner export tariff 
data was aggregated into my 15 industries classification by simple average. There is 
no data for the 1989-1991 period for China, so I assumed that in these years the tariff 
level was the same as 1992. 
 The Argentinean import tariffs on Brazilian products data at 4-digit ISIC level 
for the 1991-2001 period comes from Freund et al. (2008). This data was first 
aggregated into 3-digit ISIC level by simple averag nd then aggregated into my 15 
                                                




industries classification by simple average, again. The data for 1990 at 3-digit ISIC 
level comes from Liftschitz (1991), and it was also used for 1989, since there's no 
data for this year. The partners import tariffs were aggregated across partners by 
industries using simple average. 
 The U.S. dollar is the predominant currency used in foreign trade transactions 
in Brazil. The nominal exchange rate data comes from the Brazilian Central Bank 
(Banco Central do Brasil), and it is the mid-month U.S. dollar per Brazilian currency 
unit. To calculate the real exchange rate faced by a Brazilian manufacturer, I used the 
IPA-OG (Índice de Preços por Atacado - Oferta Global) wholesale price index 
calculated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas as the Brazilian producers price index, and 
for U.S. the Producer Price Index calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau. I chose 
August of 1994 as the base month, which means IPA-OG and PPI are rebased to be 
equal to one at this date. The calculations are similar to Muendler (2004), but my 
series range from 1989 to 2001. 
 The Colombian import tariff data for 1983-1998 come from the Colombian 
National Planning Department (DNP) and are aggregated at 4-digit ISIC, using 
number of tariff lines as weights. I further aggregated it to my industry classification 
by simple average. 
 
Estimations and Results 
 First, I investigate the model prediction on the share of informal workers. 
Next, the predictions about formal-informal wage gap are assessed, and last, but not 




this section, I assume that τ and τforeign contain only foreign countries import tariffs 
(hereafter called export tariffs) and Brazilian import tariffs respectively. 
Share of informal workers 
 The first empirical exercise conducted is to estima e the effects of changes in 
τ  and τforeign on the share of informal workers. The empirical strategy used to 
estimate these effects comes from equation (1.54) in the theoretical model. As seen in 
the previous section, the observable characteristics of formal and informal workers 
are not equal. A problem on the consistency of estimates from equation (1.54) using a 
constructed informality share directly from the informal indicator arises if there's 
selection into informal jobs based on the observable characteristics of the worker. So, 
I'll estimate a worker level pooled cross-section regression in which the dependent 
variable is the informality indicator, informalijt, which incorporates the workers 
characteristics. In this specification, the informal share is interpreted as the sum of all 
the workers expected job formality status. Thus, an increase in the likelihood of 
having an informal job is translated as an increase in the expected share of informal 
workers. 
 The specification used is described by equation (2.2), where jtextar  is the 
export tariff faced by Brazilian made goods in industry j in year t, jtimptar  is the 
import tariff faced by foreign produced goods in industry j in year t, tyear  is a vector 
of year specific dummy variables, jindustry  is a vector of industry indicators, 
ijtsticscharacteri  is a matrix of worker observable characteristics such as age, age
2 , 




error term. All estimations using the informal indicator as dependent variable used the 
PNAD/Census sample weights. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients were 
clustered on industry by year. Proposition (2) predicts that a decrease in Brazilian 
import tariffs (τforeign) increases the share of informal workers whereas a decrease in 
export tariffs faced by Brazilian producers (τ) decrease the informality share, thus  











   (2.2) 
 Year effects were included in the estimated model to control for economy-
wide shocks, such as business cycles. Consider the cas  that business cycle could 
affect independently informal share and import tariffs, e.g. suppose in recessions 
firms employing formal workers are more likely to reduce employment and at the 
same time government raises tariffs in response to r cessions, as a result a spurious 
relation between tariffs and informal share would be found unless the estimated 
model contains year effects. 
 Furthermore, some industry specific characteristic variables that are correlated 
with right-hand side variables may have been omitted and this could lead to an 
omitted variable bias and inconsistent estimates. One example is across industry 
differences in the likelihood of government audits. This can happen because of either 
political economy reasons or easiness in hiding operations, since it is easier to hide an 
apparel firm which can vary a lot in size than hide a steel mill, which can't be small 
due to technological constraints. As long as these industry characteristics are stable 




tackle this problem. Thus, the identification of 1β and 2β  will come from within 
industry variation in these tariffs over time. 
 Table (2.3) reports the OLS estimates of equation (2.2) in column (1), in 
which the estimated import and export tariff coefficients were not statistically 
significant. A percentage point decrease in import ta iffs implies an increases the 
likelihood of becoming an informal worker by 0.28 percentage points, or equivalently 
an increase of 0.28 percentage points in the informal share. For a similar change in 
export tariffs the effect is an increase in informality share of 0.03 percentage points. 
 A major concern is the endogeneity of the import tariff variable. One reason is 
the way the import tariffs were aggregated, because the value added by industry is 
jointly determined with the share of informal workers and the average formal and 
informal wages. A second reason is when government has disutility over 
unemployment and is indifferent if jobs are formal or informal. In this case, one could 
expect larger import tariffs cut in industries in which it is possible to have a large 
share of workers in informality. Thus, there would be a reverse causation between 
import tariffs and informality variables. A third reason is from a public finance 
perspective. A decrease in import tariffs destroys formal jobs and decreases the 
payroll tax revenues. The government can respond by increasing enforcement or 
raising payroll taxes to increase revenues. Althoug the latter didn't happen in Brazil, 
the former is unobservable17, and will be correlated with import tariffs. Finally, there 
may exist other time varying factors affecting both share of informal workers and 
import tariffs. To cope with these issues I employ an instrumental variable approach. 
                                                
17As discussed earlier, the only evidence available is the increase in the number of firms visited by 




Independent Variables Dependent Variable:  informal job indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Import  tariff -0.280 -0.795*** -0.803*** -0.728*** 
(0.231) (0.232) (0.241) (0.169) 
Export tariff -0.033 0.349** 0.356** 0.294** 
(0.100) (0.161) (0.167) (0.144) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 767087 767087 767087 767087 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic)   4.70** 4.47** 7.24** 
 [0.030] [0.034] [0.027] 
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  159021 152138 93855 
Stock-Yogo 10% max IV size critical values   16.38 16.38 19.93 
Hausman Endogeneity Test  
8.918*** 8.892*** 6.376** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] 
Hansen Over identification test    
0.913 
      [0.339] 
1st stage F statistic   316821 312812 315631 
Instruments (estimated coefficients in the 1st stage)   
Colombian tariff  0.426***  4.587*** 
 (0.001)  (0.029) 
Real exchange rate*Colombian tariff   0.326*** -3.238*** 
  (0.001) (0.023) 
Standard errors clustered on industry by year report d in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
 




 Both Brazil and Colombia pursued an import substitution policy in the recent 
past. Then, in a certain moment, they decided to engage in a trade liberalization of the 
manufacturing sector. Colombia's trade liberalization started after 1984 ended by the 
middle of the 1990s. The use of lagged Colombian import tariffs as instruments for 
the Brazilian import tariffs is based on the idea th t the change in trade policy that 
happened in both countries had two components. The first is a trade liberalization 
motive, which leads to a decrease in all tariffs. The second is the effect of the local 
informal labor market on the trade policy, where threverse causation comes from. 
To be a valid instrument, the correlation between the Colombian tariff and the 
Brazilian tariff should only come from the trade liberalization component. According 
to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005, p. 78) the Colombian government conducted the 
trade liberalization to achieve a somewhat uniform tariff rate negotiated with the 
WTO, to be more precise the agreement was to have a uniform tariff of 13% across 
industries. As a consequence, Colombian policy-makers were less able to let 
informality concerns affect the tariff reduction. Thus, I believe that the effect of 
Colombian informal labor market on the Colombian import tariffs is not correlated 
with the effect of the Brazilian informal labor market on the Brazilian import tariffs. 
 The 1984 Colombian tariff level will be considered as the pre-reform level 
and I'll match the 1984 Colombian tariffs to 1989 Brazilian tariffs, and so on. The use 
of a five year lagged tariffs has the advantage that contemporaneous Brazilian tariffs 
wouldn't affect past Colombian tariffs. They present a raw correlation of 0.5. In the 
estimates, I'll use the Colombian tariffs and its interaction with Brazilian real 




of exogenous variation, real exchange rate, which affects trade and is industry-
invariant. 
 The 2SLS estimates of equation (2.2) are reported in columns (2), (3), and (4) 
of table (2.3). In all three specifications the estima ed coefficients had the expected 
signs, were statistically significant and similar in magnitude. The results from column 
(2) can be interpreted as follows. A percentage point decrease in import tariffs 
increases the informal share by 0.8 percentage points and a percentage point decrease 
in export tariffs decreases the share by 0.35 percentag  points. The magnitude of this 
estimates are reasonable. Using the average decreas in import tariffs of 22 
percentage points and the average decrease in export tariff of 10 percentage points, 
we would expect an increase in the informal share by 14 percentage points while the 
observed increase was 9 percentage points, which is nside the confidence interval of 
our estimate. 
 The exogeneity of import tariffs were rejected at the 5% level in all 
specifications by the Hausman test. There was no rejection in the over-identification 
test for model (4), which is the only over-identified model estimated. The first stage 
variation occurs at the industry-year level, so the next econometrics tests involve the 
first stage estimates, and they were calculated from first stage estimates without 
clustering the standard error on industry by year. The instruments used were 
statistically significant in the first stage regressions, and their F-statistics were above 
10 and very large indeed. One may suspect that this last result is due to the large 
number of included instruments, however the Kleinberger-Paap test of under-




the 5% level in all specifications. The under-identification occurs when the matrix of 
included and excluded instruments does not have full rank. 
 The next concern is relative to weak instruments that I assessed by calculating 
the weak identification Kleibergen-Paap rK Wald F-statistic. The values obtained 
were superior to the Stock-Yogo 10% maximum IV size critical values. It means that 
the null hypothesis of a bias larger than 10% due to weak instruments was rejected. 
So far the results supported strongly the predictions from the theoretical model. To 
calculate how much of the variation in informality indicator the estimated model can 
explain, I used Wooldridge (2002, p. 465) suggestion o find the percent of correctly 
predicted outcome. If the predicted probability of having an informal job is larger 
than 0.5, I'll assume that the individual has an informal job, otherwise the individual 
has an informal job. The estimated model in column (2) was able to explain 12% of 
the variation in the informality indicator, which is reasonable given the dichotomous 
nature of the informal indicator. 
Formal-informal wage gap 
 The other informal labor market outcome we are intrested in is the formal-
informal wage gap. Equation (2.3) describes the specification used to assess the 
impact of trade policy changes on the estimated wage gap. Proposition (4) states that 
a decrease in Brazilian import tariffs (τforeign) increases the wage gap and a decrease in 
export tariffs (τ) decrease the wage gap, thus 01 >β  and 02 <β  are expected. The 
motivation for including year and industry effects are the same as before and again it 
may be the case that import tariffs are endogenous. 




 Table (2.4) reports the estimates of equation (2.3) by OLS in column (1) and 
by 2SLS in columns (2), (3), and (4). The estimated standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In all estima es the weights used were the 
inverse of the estimated wage gap standard errors. The tariff coefficient estimates 
reported in column (1) were not statistically significant and didn't have the expected 
signs. The 2SLS estimates of the import and export tariff coefficients were all 
statistically significant at 5% level, had the expected signs and were similar in 
magnitude across specifications. The estimated coeffi ients in column (2) indicate an 
increase of 0.4 percentage point in the wage gap for a percentage point decrease in 
import tariffs, and a 0.17 increase in wage gap for a percentage point decrease in 
export tariffs. The model in column (2) is able to account for 50% of the variation in 
the formal-informal wage gap. 
 The exogeneity of import tariffs was rejected by the Hausman test in all three 
2SLS specifications. The first stage F-statistics were larger than ten and the excluded 
instruments were significant at 5% level in columns (2) and (3), but not in column 
(4). I suspect this lack of statistical significance comes from colinearity between them 
since they were jointly statistically significant. The null hypothesis of under-
identification in the first stage using Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic was rejected for 
all models. Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap rK Wald F-statistic used in the weak 
identification test was larger than the Stock-Yogo critical values for all cases. So we 
were able to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The over-identified 





Independent Variables Dependent Variable: formal-informal wage gap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Import tariff 0.100 -0.403** -0.394** -0.406** 
(0.103) (0.189) (0.191) (0.188) 
Export tariff -0.055 0.169** 0.168** 0.170** 
(0.113) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 180 180 180 180 
2nd stage F statistic 414.6 219.21 9.371 7.168 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
 
46.519*** 45.18*** 46.66*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  
54.86 52.70 27.35 
Stock-Yogo 10% max IV size critical values  
16.38 16.38 19.93 
Hausman Endogeneity Test  
4.955** 4.519** 5.064** 
 
[0.026] [0.034] [0.024] 
Hansen Over identification test 
   
0.139 
    
[0.710] 
1st stage F statistic   80.01 82.34 79.79 
Instruments (estimated coef. in 1st stage)     








Real exchange rate*Colombian tariff   
0.394*** -0.147 
      (0.132) (0.487) 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets. 
Year and industry effects and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. 
Weights used are the inverse of the wage gap estimated standard errors. 
 





 The first robustness check of the informal share results consists of dealing 
with a possible different effect of education on the likelihood of having an informal 
job across industries, and it can be accounted for in the empirical specification by 
including interactions between the years of education variable and the industry 
indicator vector. The estimates are reported in columns (1)-(4) of table (2.5). The 
OLS estimates were again not statistically significant, but I confirm that the 2SLS 
estimates were significant and had the expected signs. The import tariff coefficients 
were slightly smaller than before and the export tariff coefficients decreased by one 
third in relation to the results from table (2.5). In all 2SLS regressions the Hausman 
test rejected the exogeneity of the import tariff variable. 
 In the same line, I further augmented the previous empirical specification by 
incorporating interactions of age and male indicator with the industry indicator 
vector. The estimates are reported in columns (5) to (8) of table (2.5). The estimated 
tariff coefficients in the OLS estimate, column (5), were not statistically significant 
again. As before, the 2SLS estimates were significat and had the expected signs. The 





Independent Variables Dependent Variable: informal job indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Import tariff -0.361 -0.765*** -0.772*** -0.704*** -0.358 -0.657*** -0.664*** -0.599*** 
(0.239) (0.230) (0.239) (0.170) (0.222) (0.212) (0.221) (0.155) 
Export tariff -0.020 0.257** 0.263** 0.207** 0.011 0.192** 0.198** 0.144** 
(0.102) (0.117) (0.121) (0.103) (0.094) (0.094) (0.096) (0.072) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 767087 767087 767087 767087 767087 76708  767087 767087 
Education interacted with industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and male interacted with 
industry No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman Endogeneity Test  
7.856*** 7.823*** 5.947** 7.264*** 7.233*** 5.470**  
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.007] [0.007] [0.019] 
Hansen Over identification test    
0.776 0.806 
      [0.379]       [0.369] 
Instruments 
   
Colombian tariff 
 X X X X 
Real exchange rate * Colombian 





Standard errors clustered on industry by year report d in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets. 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
 
Table 2.5 - Linear probability of model of having an informal job with interactions between industry indicators, years of education, 




 In the next robustness check I'm interested in finding out if the results are 
driven by some observations with large values. Instead of using tariffs in the previous 
specifications, I used a nonlinear and monotonic transformation in the tariffs, i.e. 
instead of the tariffs, I'll be using )1log( tariff+  in my estimates. This logarithmic re-
scaling has the advantage of reducing the influence of large values in the estimates. 
The regressions output are displayed in table (2.6), in which columns (1)-(4) refers to 
the baseline specification, columns (5)-(8) specifications include the interaction 
between education and industry indicators, and specifications in columns (9)-(12) 
include interactions between age and industry indicators and between male indicator 
and industry indicators. 
 In the baseline specification, column (1) of table (2.6) displays the OLS tariff 
coefficient estimates that were not statistically significant. They can be interpreted as 
percentage changes. So, a change in import tariffs by one percent increase informal 
share by 0.44 percent. For a similar change in the export tariff the informal share 
responds with an increase of 0.007 percent. Now, the 2SLS estimates portrayed in 
columns (2)-(4) showed statistically significant tariff coefficients with the expected 
signs. When the interactions were added to the baseline specification the 2SLS 
coefficients remained statistically significant and their magnitude declined, similar to 
what happened in table (2.7). Surprisingly, the OLS estimates from columns (5) and 
(9) presented estimated coefficients with the expected signs with import tariffs being 
statistically significant at 10% in column (1) and at 5% in column (9), with 
magnitudes of about 50% of the 2SLS estimates. The exogeneity of import tariffs 





Independent Variables Dependent Variable: informal job indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
log(1+import tariff) -0.447 -1.20*** -1.22*** -1.06*** -0.56* -1.13*** -1.15*** -1.02*** -0.55** -0.97 *** -0.98*** -0.86*** 
(0.292) (0.414) (0.436) (0.288) (0.299) (0.399) (0.419) (0.286) (0.279) (0.361) (0.380) (0.256) 
log(1+export  tariff) -0.007 0.586** 0.603** 0.470** 0.011 0.436** 0.450** 0.335** 0.050 0.325** 0.338** 0.232** 
(0.126) (0.284) (0.293) (0.235) (0.127) (0.216) (0.228) (0.167) (0.117) (0.159) (0.168) (0.115) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 767087 767087 767087 767087 767087 76708  767087 767087 767087 767087 767087 767087 
Education interacted 
with industry 
dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and male 
interacted with 
industry No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman 
Endogeneity Test 
 7.787*** 7.801*** 4.658**  6.738*** 6.732*** 4.461** 6.181** 6.173** 4.193** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.031]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.035] [0.013] [0.013] [0.041] 
Hansen Over 
identification test 
   0.923    0.719 0.722 
      [0.337]       [0.397]       [0.396] 
Instruments 
   
log(1+Colombian 
tariff)  X X X X X X 
Rer*log(1+Colombian 







Standard errors clustered on industry by year report d in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets.  Rer is the real exchange rate.
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
 






Variables Dependent Variable: informal job indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Import tariff 0.720 -2.96*** -2.986*** -2.743*** 0.592 -2.77*** -2.795*** -2.59*** 0.649 -2.17** -2.186** -2.01*** 
(0.796) (1.004) (1.032) (0.789) (0.789) (0.955) (0.981) (0.758) (0.705) (0.848) (0.873) (0.658) 
Export tariff -0.498 2.688* 2.712* 2.518* 
-
0.486* 2.432* 2.452* 2.287* -0.304 2.144* 2.161* 2.0 2* 
(0.303) (1.463) (1.473) (1.421) (0.291) (1.374) (1.381) (1.353) (0.249) (1.212) (1.218) (1.196) 
Technique Probit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit Probit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit Probit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit 




dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and male 
interacted with 
industry No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity Test 
  7.031*** 6.772*** 9.108***   6.835*** 6.583*** 8.838*** 5.745** 5.527** 7.576*** 
  [0.008] [0.009] [0.003]   [0.009] [0.010] [0.003]   [0.017] [0.019] [0.006] 
Instruments 
   
Colombian tariff  X X X X X X 
Rer*Colombian 




X   
  X 
X 
Standard errors clustered on industry by year report d in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets. Rer is the real exchange rate.
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
 





 Now, given the binary nature of the informality ind cator I'll use econometric 
techniques that take this fact into account. Thus, I used Probit instead of OLS and 
IVProbit instead of 2SLS. The estimates are reported in table (2.7), where columns 
(1)-(4) refers to the baseline specification, columns(5)-(8) specifications include the 
interaction between education and industry indicators, and specifications in columns 
(9)-(12) are augmented with interactions between age nd industry indicators and 
between male indicator and industry indicators. TheProbit regressions, columns (1), 
(5) and (9), didn't present any statistically significant estimates for the tariff variables 
at 5% level of significance. The IVProbit estimates, the remaining columns, presented 
estimated coefficients with the expected signs, in which the import tariff coefficient 
were always significant at 5% level whereas the export tariff coefficient were 
significant at the 10% level, with p-values between six and seven percent. In all 
IVProbit estimates the exogeneity of the import tariffs were rejected at the 1% level. 
The share of correctly predicted outcomes calculated for the estimated model in 
column (2) was 0.18, almost twice the share of the lin ar IV probability model. In 
sum, it seems that trade policy changes indeed affected the share of informal workers 
in Brazil. 
 The last exercise involving the informality indicator consists of omitting the 
export tariff variable in the some of the previous specifications. The standard errors 







Independent Variables Dependent Variable: informal job indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Import  tariff -0.080 -0.602*** -0.599** -0.611*** -0.350 -1.549* -1.508* -1.658* 
(0.114) (0.230) (0.236) (0.217) (0.345) (0.858) (0.866) (0.958) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit 
Observations 767087 767087 767087 767087 767087 76708  767087 767087 
Endogeneity Test 
11.85*** 11.58*** 12.66***   5.065** 4.528** 4.408** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 [0.024] [0.033] [0.036] 
Hansen Over identification test    
0.146     
      [0.702]         
Instruments 
   
Colombian tariff  X X X X 
Real exchange rate*Colombian tariff 
  
X X  
X X 
Standard errors clustered on industry by year report d in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets. 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models.  
Sample weights used.     
 
 






 Column (1) of table (9) contains the OLS import taiff coefficient estimate, 
which are not statistically significant as before. The 2SLS estimates, in columns (2)-
(4), were significant at 5% level and had the expected negative sign. The magnitude 
of the coefficients was about 25% smaller than the estimates from table (2.3), even 
though this difference is not statistically significant. The exogeneity of import tariffs 
was rejected by the Hausman test in these three specifications. 
 The Probit estimate is shown in column (5), and the import tariff coefficient 
wasn't statistically significant. Columns (6)-(8) contain the estimates using the IV 
Probit technique. The estimated coefficients of import tariffs were not statistically 
significant at 5% level, though they were significant t 10% level. The exogeneity of 
import tariffs was rejected in all cases. These results mean that omitting export tariffs 
even in an instrumental variable framework may matter for the estimates. In sum, it 
seems that trade policy changes indeed affected the share of informal workers in 
Brazil. 
 The robustness checks for the formal-informal wage gap models consists of 
the use of a log transformation of tariffs instead of the tariffs themselves, and in 
estimate the previous specifications without including the export tariff variables. 
Table (2.9) presents estimates of the previous specification of the wage gap, but now 
using )1log( tariffs+  instead of the tariff variables. Column (1) contais the OLS 
estimated coefficients and although they had the expected signs, they were not 
statistically significant. The 2SLS estimates, columns (2)-(4) had the expected signs 




Independent Variables Dependent Variable: formal-informal wage gap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (1+import tariff) -0.076 -4.324*** -4.631** -4.226*** 
(0.155) (1.425) (1.831) (1.380) 
Log (1+export tariff) 0.116 3.010** 3.085** 2.986** 
  (0.126) (1.232) (1.260) (1.230) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 180 180 180 180 
2nd stage F statistic 421 10.41 10.40 10.35 
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 40.70*** 40.05*** 40.72*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 45.908 44.935 22.82 
Stock-Yogo 10% max IV size critical values 16.38 16.38 19.93 
Hausman Endogeneity Test 
6.121** 5.518** 6.026** 
[0.013] [0.019] [0.014] 
Hansen Over identification test 0.167 
 [0.712] 
1st stage F statistic   56.64 44.82 56.70 
Instruments (estimated coefficients in 1st stage) 
log(1+Colombian tariff) -0.177*** -0.248*** 
(0.044) (0.088) 
Real exchange rate*log(1+Colombian tariff) -0.084*** 0.056 
      (0.024) (0.045) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets. 
Year and industry effects and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. 
 




percent decrease in import tariff increases wage gap by 4 percent, and the effect of 
one percent decrease in export tariff is a three percent decrease in the wage gap. The 
results of the econometric tests performed were similar to the results presented in 
table (2.6), in particular the exogeneity of import tariff variable was rejected at 5% 
level in all 2SLS estimates. 
 Omitting the export tariffs in the estimated models had a dramatic effect on 
the estimates, as presented in table (2.10). Column (1) contains the OLS estimate in 
which the import tariff wasn't statistically significant. Columns (2)-(4) shows the 
2SLS estimates. The estimated import tariff coefficients were not statistically 
significant in any specification. Notice that in the first stage of the 2SLS estimates, 
the instruments behaved in a similar fashion to the estimates that included export 
tariffs. So, export tariffs matter in the second stage of the estimation procedure. For 






Independent Variables Dependent Variable: formal-informal wage gap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
import tariff -0.015 -0.153 -0.160 -0.154 
(0.080) (0.164) (0.165) (0.164) 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 180 180 180 180 
Hansen Over identification test    0.112 
   
[0.738] 
Hausman Endogeneity Test  
1.069 1.145 1.069 
 [0.301] [0.285] [0.301] 
1st stage F-statistic   63.66 54.02 61.78 
Instruments     
Colombian tariff  0.503*** 0.505 
 (0.162) (0.692) 
Real Exchange rate*Col. tariff  0.377*** -0.001 
      (0.124) (0.494) 
HAC robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in brackets 
Year and industry effects and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models 
Weights used are the inverse of the wage gap estimated standard errors 
 
Table 2.10 – Effect of tariffs on the formal-informal wage gap regressions without 








 I used the 1989-2001 Brazilian trade liberalization t  assess my theoretical 
model predictions about the effects of trade policy changes on the industry share of 
informal workers and on the formal-informal wage gap. This episode data allows the 
identification of informal workers according to payroll tax compliance, which is 
exactly the same way they are defined in my theoretical model. This clear connection 
between theory and empirics is a novel feature in the informal labor literature. 
 Interestingly, I find that the Brazilian import tariff is endogenous with respect 
to informal share and formal-informal wage gap. To circumvent this problem, I use 
an instrumental variable approach, and the instrument used is the liberalization path 
of a similar country, which was less influenced by informal labor markets. This 
finding suggest that the government is not passive with respect to informal labor 
market in the sense that it may choose optimally the level of payroll tax enforcement 
taking into account its trade policy. This point certainly deserves more investigation. 
 According to my estimates, a percentage point decrease in Brazilian import 
tariffs led to an increase of 0.8 percentage points i  the informal share, while the 
same decrease in trade partners import tariff (export barriers) decreased informal 
share by 0.35 percentage points. These results are in line with my theoretical model 
predictions. Importantly, the magnitude of the effect is very plausible since at the 
average change of import tariffs and export barriers t eturns a 12 percentage points 
increase in informality, while the observed is about 9 percentage points. These results 
are in sharp contrast with the previous literature (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005) that 




 The formal-informal wage gap estimates also provide strong support for the 
respective theoretical predictions. A percentage point decrease in import tariffs 
implied an increase in the wage gap by 0.4 percentag  points, whereas a percentage 
point decrease in export barriers decreased the wag g p by 0.17 percentage points. 
About 50% of the variation in the estimated wage gap v riation can be explained by 
my empirical model. At the end of the day, I found that trade policy does indeed 
affect informal labor markets, at least in the Brazili n case. 
 I check the robustness of my estimates by performing several exercises. The 
only case my findings are not robust happens when t export barriers are omitted in 
the estimated models. This fact supports my theoretical model, in which export 
barriers not only have a counterbalance effect to import barriers but also have a 
significant quantitative effect. The latter seems to be the case because when the 
export barriers are omitted, the estimated effect of import barriers is not statistically 
significant. 
 These results have important policy implications. Contrary to previous 
findings, unilateral trade liberalization can increas  the informality share and the 
formal-informal wage gap. And, reciprocal trade liberalizations can mitigate and even 
overcome this increase in informality. 
 In sum, the theoretical model was designed to make informal jobs generation 
as close as possible to reality, in addition it hasstrong empirical support for its 
predictions. Hence I believe it is a very good framework to study informal labor 




tariffs and payroll taxation which might lead to anoptimal size of informal labor 




Chapter 3 - Trade Liberalization and Industry Wage Pr mia: The 
missing role of Productivity  
 
 In this chapter I will study the effect of trade liberalization on inter-industry 
wage premium. Changes in wage premium can increase inequality if the wage 
premium decreases less in skill intensive sectors, f  example. Several papers like 
Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers (1989), and Borjas and Ramey 
(2000) found that industry wage premium is an important share of the wage in U.S., 
and the wage premium has significant variation across industries. For developing 
countries, Pavcnik et al. (2004) also found that wage premium accounted for a large 
share of wages in Brazil. On the other hand, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) found it is 
not the case in Colombia.  
 The literature relating wage premium to import tariff changes is recent, but its 
ancestors were interested in the effect of tariffs on industry rents (measured by mark-
ups) and the effect of tariffs on productivity. Harrison (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire, 
Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco found that 
tariffs decline implied lower markups, which could affect wage premia if industry 
rents are shared with the workers.  
 The studies that assess directly the effect of trade policy changes on inter-
industry wage premium provide mixed evidence of its s gn and magnitude. Feliciano 
(2001) found that the change in tariffs didn’t affect wage premium in Mexico. 
Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg and Schady (2004) found no effect for Brazil. Goldberg and 




premium in Colombia, and Mishra and Kumar (2007) found that a decrease in tariffs 
led to an increase in wage premia in India. 
 I assess the effect of trade liberalization on the int r-industry wage premium 
by focusing on the Colombian episode that started in the 1980s and on two key 
aspects ignored by the previous literature. The first is whether trade policy changes 
affect differently wage premium based on industry characteristics. I use the 
methodology of previous studies such as Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) to assess if the 
tariff effect is similar for tradable and non-tradable industries, and manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. I find that wage premia were sensitive to changes in 
import tariffs only the tradable industries, in particular manufacturing. 
 The second question is the role of productivity in simultaneously determining 
the industry wage premium and import tariffs. Although the reasons for the existence 
of the wage premia are not clear, there’s evidence that higher productivity industry 
workers enjoy higher wage premium18. The potential endogeneity of import tariffs 
due to political economy concerns has been handled by the use of instrumental 
variables technique, which also takes care of omitted variable problem. Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005) and others use the pre-trade reform import tariff level as an 
instrument for the import tariff change. Nevertheless, this type of instrument may not 
work when productivity is an omitted variable and is part of the error term. 
Karacaovali (2005) presented a theoretical model of political economy of trade 
liberalization in which the benefits of trade protection increases with productivity. He 
also found empirical evidence for Colombia that productivity influenced the level of 
                                                





import tariffs. Given that productivity is a process with some time persistence, and 
Karacaovali (2005) showed it’s the case for Colombia, current productivity would 
still be correlated with the pre-trade reform tariff level, and thus the instrument will 
be correlated with the error term. 
 Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective the omission of productivity 
leaves room for the effect of tariffs on wages to have an ambiguous sign because in 
this case the tariff coefficient would be the net rsult of the effect of tariffs on 
productivity (which may be positive or negative ex ante) and the effect of tariffs on 
industry rents shared with workers (which is positive ex ante). Therefore, I ask if 
trade liberalization increases or decreases the inter-i dustry wage premia after we 
account for the impact of productivity on trade policy. I also assess the magnitude of 
the bias in previous studies that fail to account for this source of endogeneity for the 
Colombian case. 
 By incorporating productivity into the estimated model, I find that 
productivity is an important determinant of the wage premium, and as an included 
instrument it does affect the change in tariffs (endogenous variable), thus it’s is an 
important time-varying factor in the import tariff setting. In addition, the impact of 
trade liberalization on the manufacturing industrie wage premium is about 50% 
smaller than the result previously obtained by ignoring productivity (using Goldberg 
and Pavcnik, 2005, methodology). As a byproduct, I find in my estimations that 
productivity is an exogenous variable, thus concerns about reverse causation between 






 The inter-industry wage premium is defined in the literature as the share of the 
worker’s wage that is attributed to industry affiliation. Its possible sources can be: (i) 
compensating differentials, (ii) different marginal productivity of labor in comparison 
with other industries due to sector specific inputs, and (iii) industry rents from 
imperfect competition in the output market.  
 The industry compensating differentials paid to workers reflect specific 
conditions given by technology or institutions that generate disutility to work in this 
industry. So it shouldn’t be affected by trade policy in case of no significant change in 
technology or institutions, which are very unlikely in the short run.  
 The second motive can be affected by trade policy because trade liberalization 
can increase total factor productivity, as found by Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, Ferreira 
and Rossi (2003) for Brazil and Karacaovali (2005) for Colombia. All else equal, an 
increase in productivity leads to an increase in excess profits, leaving room for an 
increase in wage premium.  
 Finally, trade policy affects the level of competitiveness in domestic markets. 
A decrease in import tariffs would force either a decrease in domestic prices19 or a 
decrease in quantity demanded, thus both effects imply a decrease in industry rents to 
be shared among factors of production. There is evidence using firm-level data for 
U.S. labor markets that higher profits induce higher wages due to rent-sharing, as 
shown by Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) andby Hildreth and Oswald 
(1997). Another possible channel is that more competition might decrease the bargain 
                                                
19 In a monopolistic competition framework, one can model the increase in competitiveness as a shock 




power of unions and/or shift their focus from wages to job security; therefore the 
share of rent wage premium would also decrease. However, this channel will depend 
on the specific negotiation framework of each industry and/or country. Over all, the 
net effect of trade openness over wage premia is ambiguous. 
 In general, changes in trade policy happen over time and across industries. In 
a situation in which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are decreasing similarly for all 
industries or non-existent, an appropriate way to measure its changes is through 
import tariffs, which certainly affect the prices. In Colombia, tariffs were at a high 
level in the early 1980s. The trade liberalization started when President Virgilio 
Vargas took office in 1986 and it was completed by his successor President Cesar 
Gaviria by 1992. This reform consisted not only in a large decrease in all import 
tariffs across all industries (generating a large decrease in average tariff) and removal 
of NTBs, but also in a change of the protection across industries because the decrease 
in tariffs was not uniform. This can be seen from figures (3.1) and (3.2) which show 
import tariffs along time for non-manufacturing and manufacturing industries 
respectively. So, this inter-industry tariff variation could be used to identify the 
relationship between wage premium and import tariffs. 
 Like in many developing countries, Colombian trade r forms were 
accompanied by other reforms. There were the labor market reform in 1990 that 
reduced dismissal costs and introduced a new severance payment system and the 
banking system reform started in 1990 and continued in 1991 aimed at liberalizing 
deposit rates, extinguish credit subsidies and modernize capital markets. Moreover, 




multinational companies were given basically the same treatment dispensed to 
Colombian firms. Finally, in 1993 there was a major change in the social security 
system20. All these reforms stress the importance of the time dimension in the 
estimates, because the wage premium could be changing as a result of these other 
reforms. I’ll use year dummy variables to control for such environment changes. 
 The changes in tariffs across industries have receiv d a great deal of attention 
by the political economy of trade protection literature. Such research agenda provides 
theoretical (Helpman and Grossman, 1994, and Karacaov li, 2005) and empirical 
(Trefler, 1993, Goldberg and Maggi, 2001, and Karacovali, 2005) evidence that 
tariffs are set taking into account some characteristics of the industry, e.g. market 
concentration, share of unskilled workers, etc. So, if some of these characteristics also 
influence the wage premium, the current tariff leve becomes an endogenous variable. 
Thus, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is not consistent. Time invariant 
industry characteristics that affect tariff setting can be controlled by adding industry 
fixed effects to the estimated model. In fact, a higher wage premium in a given 
industry might induce its workers to lobby against trade liberalization21 
 
                                                
20 Eslava et al (2004) and Kugler (1999) are good references for the Colombian economic reforms. 
21 A possible time variant political economy factor is union activity. Fortunately, it doesn’t seem to be 


















Figure 3.1 – Colombian non
96 





































 In the presence of industry fixed effects and year dummy variables, the 
identification of the tariff coefficient will come from within industry tariff variation, 
excluding the variation due to a common time trend o  tariffs across all industries. 
The model estimated by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) is given by equation (3.1) 
ittiitit errorTariffsmwagepremiu ++++= θδβα   (3.1) 
where i is the industry index and t is the time index, δi is a set of industry fixed effects 
and θt are the time effects. 
 Since this specification does not account for other ime varying variables that 
affect tariffs and wage premium simultaneously, tariffs are not necessarily orthogonal 
to the error term. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) acknowledged this possibility and 
suggested the estimation of the first difference of equation (3.1) by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), using instruments for the change in tar ffs. The instruments chosen 
by them are the 1983 tariff level and its interactions with exchange rate and coffee 
price. The reason behind the choice of 1983 tariff level is that it is the tariff level 
some years before the trade policy changes and Goldberg and Pavcnik showed that 
the tariff cut is proportional to the initial tariff level, i.e. the higher the 1983 tariff the 
larger the tariff decrease in absolute terms. The use of the interactions with exchange 
rate and coffee prices (the most important Colombian export product) are based on 
the perception that the Colombian trade reform was conducted taking into account the 
trade balance levels. So, exchange rate devaluations (smaller import volumes) would 
lead to larger decrease in tariffs and increases in coffee prices (larger export 




 In the labor literature, Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and Borjas and Ramey 
(2000) found evidence of a positive correlation between productivity and wage 
premium for U.S., however, the reasons behind this correlation are not clear. One 
possibility could be that an increase in productivity leads to an increase in excess 
profits, which are then shared with the workers. Thus productivity is an omitted 
variable in equation (3.1). Once it’s accounted for, we would be able to identify 
separately the effects of the different marginal productivity of labor in comparison 
with other industries due to sector specific inputs, and of the industry rents on the 
wage premium. 
 Karacaovali (2005) presents both theoretical and empirical evidence that 
manufacturing industry productivity is an important political economy factor that 
affects tariff setting. In special, his empirical evidence is about the same Colombian 
trade liberalization episode discussed here. According to his theoretical model, the 
higher the industry productivity the higher the benefits from protection accrued to the 
firms of that industry. So, the initial (1983) tariff level was established taking into 
account the productivity at that time. He also presented empirical evidence that 
productivity in Colombia is correlated with import tariffs and it shows a lot of time 
persistence, therefore old tariffs are correlated with current productivity levels, e.g. 
1983 tariff level has a 0.22 correlation with 1990 productivity.  
 The omission of the productivity variable in equation (3.1) generates omitted 
variable bias. Additionally, the 1983 tariff level is correlated with current 
productivity, which is in the error term. Therefore it is not a valid instrument. In order 




productivity in the estimated model to solve the omitted variable problem and to 
remove the correlation between the instrument (1983 tariff level) and the error term 
due to productivity.  
 The productivity measure I use is the natural logarithm of the total factor 
productivity (TFP), which is the measure used by Bartel and Sicherman (1999) for the 
US. In the manufacturing industries sample used in this paper, the simple correlation 
between productivity and the wage premium is 0.373, and the correlation between the 
first-difference of the same variables is 0.45. Figures (3.3) and (3.4) show the wage 
premium along time for non-manufacturing and manufact ring industries 
respectively. Figure (3.5) exhibits the evolution of productivity for manufacturing 
industries along time. We can see that wage premium and productivity vary along 
time and their ranking also changes over time.  
 I incorporate the productivity of industry j at time t, log(TFPjt), as a regressor 
in equation (3.1) and then take the first difference. The resulting model is shown in 
equation (3.2).  
jttjtjtjt errorTFPTariffsmwagepremiu ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ θγβ )log(   (3.2) 
where ∆wagepremiumjt= wagepremiumjt - wagepremiumjt-1. A similar definition 
applies to all other variables preceded by the “∆” . 
 The introduction of the productivity variable on the right-hand side may 
generate a potential problem: reverse causation. This can occur if the firms pay 




of labor to avoid shirking22. And by doing so, the workers’ productivity increas s. 
Since there are industries in which monitoring may be easier, the efficiency wage will 
vary over industries and be at least partly captured by the wage-premium.  
To address this source of reverse causality and check if it is a real concern, I estimate 
equation (3.2) by instrumental variables considering at first both productivity and 
tariffs as endogenous, and then considering only tariffs s endogenous. The next step 
consists in performing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to test if productivity is really an 
endogenous variable. Similarly to Karacaovali (2005) I employ the following 
instruments for productivity: the contemporaneous natural logarithm of the capital 
stock of the industry, and the contemporaneous natural logarithm of material prices 
minus natural log of aggregated level PPI-Producer Price Index. Since the estimations 
of (3.2) are in first differences, I’ll work with the first difference of the above 
instruments. 
 
                                                
22 This would be the case in a simple Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model. However, this may not 

















Figure 3.3 - Colombian non-manufacturing industries wage premium in terms of 
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Figure 3.4 - Colombian manufacturing industries wage premium expr ssed in terms of 
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 The data used in this paper includes the variables in Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2005), namely tariff, exchange rate and coffee price data and their estimated wage 
premium and its standard error. And the productivity and its instruments data come 
from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004). The years encompassed by my 
sample are 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996and 1998.  
 The data set used to estimate the wage premium consists of the June waves of 
Colombian National Household Survey – NHS (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) 
conducted by the Colombian Statistical Agency (DANE). This survey is a repeated 
cross-section covering urban areas of Colombia. It contains questions about 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education, literacy, etc…), 
job type, industry of employment at 2-digit ISIC level (total of 33 industries), and 
region of residence.  
 Similar to Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers (1989), and 
Borjas and Ramey (2000), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) estimated the industry wage 
premium separately for every year of the sample using equation (3.3).  
ijt
j
jtijtHijtijt mwagepremiuIw εβ ++= ∑ *)ln( H   (3.3) 
where ln(wijt) is the natural logarithm of the worker’s hourly wage for worker i 
affiliated to industry j at time t, Hijt is a vector that contains worker’s age, age 
squared, male indicator, married indicator, head of the household indicator, 




category is incomplete elementary education), literacy indicator, residence in Bogotá 
indicator, occupational indicators and job type indicators. I ijt   is “1” if person i worked 
in industry j in year t and its coefficient captures the share of the wage attributed to 
industry affiliation, i.e. inter-industry wage premiu . Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) 
used all available industries (33 industries) under 2-digit ISIC classification to 
compute the wage premium, in which industry ISIC 62 (retail sales) is the omitted 
category. The estimated wage premium was then normalized as deviations from the 
employment-weighted average wage premium and their standard errors were 
calculated using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted least-
squares procedure. 
 This type of specification does not control for worker’s choice of industry. I 
believe this is not an important problem because Borjas and Ramey (2000) casts 
serious doubt about this possibility for U.S., and there’s evidence of little inter-
industry switching by workers in Colombia, as portrayed by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003). So, if there’s sorting it seems to be stable over time, and the industry fixed 
effects on the second stage estimation would take cre of it. 
 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) tariff data at 2-digit ISIC level comes from the 
Colombian Planning Department (DNP). It is available for only 20 industries, the 
manufacturing industries (ISIC31-39) are among them, and it consists of the weighted 
average of the tariffs of the more disaggregated categories by the number of product 
lines. The exchange rate is the nominal effective rat from IMF, which is a currency 
bundle encompassing the currencies of the most important Colombian trade partners. 




 The Eslava et al. (2004) productivity data is constructed from the firm-level 
data from the Colombian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) conducted by DANE. 
Such nice dataset allows less biased firm-level estimates because there’s no need to 
rely in non-parametric methods and industry level price deflators as proxies for 
missing plant-level data. The variables used in this paper are the total factor 
productivity estimated with KLEM methodology, capital stock, and material prices 
deviated from producers’ price index (PPI). The data were aggregated using 
production shares from firm-level estimates. The productivity data is available only 
for manufacturing at 2-digit industry level (ISIC 31- 9). 
 
Estimations and results 
Industry characteristics and the import tariff effect on the wage premium 
 
 The first question to be answered is whether the eff ct of tariffs on wage 
premium changes according to industry characteristics, in particular between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, and between tradable industries and 
non-tradable industries. This question is important because manufacturing and/or 
tradable industries are more exposed to foreign producer competition relative to 
service industries. 
 I split the data between manufacturing (ISIC 3) and non-manufacturing 
industries, i.e. agriculture (ISIC 1), mining (ISIC 2) and services (ISIC 4, 6, 8, and 9), 




for each sample, equivalent to what Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) did in their table 6b 
using all the industries. The instruments used are the 1983 tariff level and its 
interactions with exchange rate and coffee prices as instruments.  
 In all estimations presented in this chapter the variables used are aggregated at 
two-digit industry level (tariffs, productivity, and wage premium). For sake of 
comparability, I follow Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and use industry clustered 
standard errors. And perform the regressions using the inverse of the standard error of 
the estimated wage premium as weights, since the dep n nt variable is an estimate.  
 The results for non-manufacturing are reported in table (3.1). Model (1) is 
estimated by OLS and the remaining by IV. The estimated tariff coefficients from 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) table 6b are reported a the bottom of table (3.1). In 
model (1) the tariff coefficient isn’t statistically significant. In models (2) through (5) 
the tariff coefficient are not statistically significant. Only model (6) presented a 
statistically significant tariff coefficient of -0.204, which means that an increase of 
one percentage point in tariffs lead to a wage premium decrease of 0.204 percentage 
points. The first stage regressions have F-statistics larger than ten and the excluded 
instruments are all statistically significant. So, given the validity of the instruments, 
finite sample bias shouldn’t be a concern here. There are no rejections in the over-
identification tests for the over-identified models (4) and (6). These results are not 
compatible with Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) findings using all industries. It seems 
that their results are not driven by the non-manufact ring industries. 
 On table (3.2) I present the output of the regression  using the manufacturing 




significant tariff coefficient of 0.143, which implies a wage premium increase of 
0.143 percentage points when tariff is increased by one percentage point. Models (2) 
to (6) are estimated by IV, and the tariff coefficients for these models are positive, but 
statistically significant only in models (4), (5) and (6), in which the coefficients range 
from 0.096 to 0.198. The first stage regressions have F-statistics larger than ten and 
the instruments are always statistically significant. The over-identification test for 
model (4) can’t reject that the model is correctly specified, but for model (6) it is 








Dependent Variable: wage premium 
2nd Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tariff -0.0278 -0.075 -0.055 -0.105 0.121 -0.204** 
 [0.205] [0.367] [0.356] [0.385] [0.989] [0.072] 












    Tariffs83  Tariffs 83 
Year dummies in 
both stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
77 77 77 77 77 77 
1st Stage       
Exchange 
rate*Tariff 83 
  -0.001** 0.003**   
   [0.000] [0.001]   
Coffee 
Price*Tariff 83 
    -0.001** 0.011** 
     [0.000] [0.001] 
Constant  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] 
       
F-statistic  110.47 72.43 68.42 66.91 504.31 
Over-
identification test 
      
Hansen-Sargan 
Statistic 
   0.517  0.065 
   (0.472)  (0.798) 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) results using all industrie  (133 observations) 
Tariff 0.1191** 0.0462** 0.0444** 0.0416 0.0362* 0.496* 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.001) (0.104) (0.087) (0.053) 
Dependent variable is the 1st difference of wage premium, and all variables are in first difference. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on industry, and are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in 
parenthesis. All variables are used in their first difference. 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 - First difference of equation (3.1) estimated by IV using only non-







Dependent Variable: wage premium 
2nd Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tariff 0.143** -0.006 0.050 0.167** 0.096** 0.198** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.031] [0.035] [0.035] [0.050] 












    Tariffs83  Tariffs 83 
Year dummies in 2nd 
stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
63 63 63 63 63 63 
1st Stage        
Year 1988  0.183** .149** 0.001 0.136** 0.074* 
  [0.028] [0.026] [0.031] [0.027] [0.037] 
Year 1990  0.143** 0.099** -0.092** 0.061* -0.050 
  [0.028] [0.027] [0.037] [0.030] [0.055] 
Year 1992  0.027 -0.027 -0.264** -0.075** -0.216** 
  [0.029] [0.028] [0.044] [0.033] [0.067] 
Year 1994  0.203** 0.164** -0.010 0.167** 0.118** 
  [0.033] [0.031] [0.037] [0.031] [0.036] 
Year 1996  0.207** 0.152** -0.092** 0.149** 0.071 
  [0.030] [0.029] [0.045] [0.030] [0.043] 
Year 1998  0.206** 0.134** -0.184** 0.158** 0.092** 
  [0.031] [0.031] [0.057] [0.030] [0.040] 
Tariffs 83  -0.169**  0.95**  0.299** 
  [0.042]  [0.154]  [0.125] 
Exchange 
rate*Tariff 83 
  -0.002** -0.010**   
   [0.0003] [0.001]   
Coffee Price*Tar. 83     -0.0023** -0.006** 
     [0.0004] [0.001] 
Constant  -0.122** -0.062* 0.100** -0.054 0.007 
  [0.029] [0.032] [0.037] [0.035] [0.042] 
       
F-statistic 1st stage  17.47 22.12 37.11 21.60 21.23 
Over-identification 
test 
      
Hansen-Sargan 
Statistic 
   1.106  4.307** 
    (0.293)  (0.038) 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) results using all industrie  (133 observations) 
Tariff 0.1191** 0.0462** 0.0444** 0.0416 0.0362* 0.496* 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.001) (0.104) (0.087) (0.053) 
Dependent variable is the 1st difference of wage premium, and all variables are in first difference. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on industry, and are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in 
parenthesis. All variables are used in their first difference. 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3.2 - First difference of equation (3.1) estimated by IV using only 




 When contrasting the models from table (3.2) in which both Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005) and I get statistically significant coefficients, we can see that my 
estimates are larger by 50% in model (1) and by more than 200% in models (5) and 
(6). After all, we saw that non-manufacturing wage pr mia weren’t affected by 
change in tariffs, while manufacturing wage premia were. If we combine both 
samples (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005), we still obtain that wage premia is affected 
by tariffs, but with a smaller coefficient. Therefore manufacturing industries seems to 
be driving Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) findings.  
 The other exercise consists of splitting the sample between tradable industries 
(ISIC 1, 2, and 3) and non-tradable industries (ISIC 4, 6,8 and 9). In this case, I’ll 
only be able to estimate the first difference of equation (3.1) for the tradable 
industries, because there’s only five non-tradable industries, and the number of 
regressors in the model would be larger than the number of clusters (cf. Baum et al., 
2003)23. 
 The results for tradable industries are exhibited in table (3.3), in which model 
(1) is estimated by OLS and the remaining models by IV. All models present a 
positive estimated tariff coefficient, which is sign ficant in all specifications except in 
model (2). The estimated tariff coefficient sizes and standard deviations are similar to 
the ones obtained using the manufacturing sample reorted in table (3.2). Moreover, 
the excluded instruments are all statistically signif cant in the first stage regressions, 
whose F-statistics are above 600. There are no rejections in the over-identifying 
restrictions test.  
                                                
23 Notice that the results obtained by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) vanish when the models are 






Dependent Variables: wage premium 
2nd Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tariff 0.157** 0.023 0.065** 0.150** 0.093** 0.161** 
 [0.033] [0.044] [0.032] [0.028] [0.037] [0.048] 












    Tariffs83  Tariffs 83 
Year dummies in 
2nd stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
105 105 105 105 105 105 
1st Stage        
Year 1988  0.174* 0.142 0.005 0.130 0.073 
  [0.090] [0.083] [0.051] [0.080] [0.064] 
Year 1990  0.136* 0.094 -0.086* 0.057 -0.044 
  [0.073] [0.064] [0.040] [0.057] [0.052] 
Year 1992  0.023 -0.029 -0.251** -0.076 -0.203** 
  [0.077] [0.067] [0.055] [0.060] [0.071] 
Year 1994  0.196** 0.157* -0.005 0.161* 0.117 
  [0.088] [0.080] [0.047] [0.080] [0.068] 
Year 1996  0.199** 0.145* -0.082* 0.143* 0.072 
  [0.087] [0.076] [0.043] [0.075] [0.058] 
Year 1998  0.197 0.128 -0.168** 0.150* 0.091 
  [0.087] [0.073] [0.052] [0.077] [0.063] 
Tariffs 83  -0.169**  0.910**  0.279** 
  [0.006]  [0.117]  [0.094] 
Exchange 
rate*Tariff 83 
  -0.002** -0.010**   
   [0.000] [0.001]   
Coffee 
Price*Tariff 83 
    -0.002** -0.005** 
     [0.000] [0.001] 
Constant  -0.116 -0.059 0.093** -0.052 0.004 
  [0.071] [0.059] [0.040] [0.058] [0.05] 
       
F-statistic 1st stage  905.80 1139.61 14184.42 612.97 1141.61 
Over-
identification test 
      
Hansen-Sargan 
Statistic 




Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) results using all industrie  (133 observations) 
Tariff 0.1191** 0.0462** 0.0444** 0.0416 0.0362* 0.496* 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.001) (0.104) (0.087) (0.053) 
Dependent variable is the 1st difference of wage premium, and all variables are in first difference. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on industry, and are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in 
parenthesis. All variables are used in their first difference. 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3.3 - First difference of equation (3.1) estimated by IV using only tradable 




 The results in Table (3.3) indicate that not only manufacturing industry wage 
premia but also the other tradable industry wage premia are indeed affected by 
changes in tariffs. Although it’s not possible to estimate the tariff coefficient for non-
tradable industries, based on the results from table (3.1) I believe it wouldn’t be 
positive and statistically significant, because the t se industries are a subset of the 
non-manufacturing industries and are the ones to present the smallest variation in 
wage premium over time. So, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) results are driven by the 
observations from the tradable industries, which respond for about a quarter of overall 
employment. 
 
The role of productivity 
 
 The next question I address is the role of productivity in the determination of 
the effect of tariffs over wage premium. The availability of productivity data 
constrains my analysis to manufacturing industries only, but as seen in the previous 
section these are the industries that are driving Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) results. 
 Now I incorporate the productivity variable in equation (3.1), and estimate its 
first difference, as shown in equation (3.2), considering tariffs as the only endogenous 
regressor, and using only the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) instruments: 1983 tariff 
level and its interactions with exchange rate and coffee price. The results are reported 
in table (3.4), in which model (1) is estimated by OLS and the remaining models are 




 The productivity coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all 
models with values ranging from 0.155 to 0.176, similar to table (3.4). The tariff 
coefficient is positive in all models, but it is statistically significant in models (1), (4), 
(5), and (6). The first stage F-statistics are all above ten, and only in model (6) there’s 
an excluded instrument (1983 tariff) that is not stati ically significant. Productivity 
variable is statistically significant in the first tage regressions of models (2), (3) and 
(5). This fact corroborates the fact that industry p oductivity can be an important 
factor of import tariff setting and its omission invalids the instruments used by 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005). There’s no rejection in the over-identifying tests, in 
particular the rejection found in model (6) of table (3.2) disappears when the 
productivity variable is included in the model. The productivity variable seems to be 
important in the determination of wage premium and t the same time its inclusion 
decreases the estimated tariff coefficient by 20 to 50% in comparison to the ones from 
table (3.2). 
 In the last set of regressions, I address the revers  causation concern, i.e. 
productivity might depend on the wage premium. So, I estimate IV models similar to 
models (2) to (6) displayed in table (3.4) using the following additional instruments: 
the first difference of material prices and of log of capital stock.  
 First, productivity is considered exogenous and the estimated models are 
shown in table (3.5). The productivity variable is positive and statistically significant 
in all specifications of this table, ranging from 0.159 to 0.177. Model (1) productivity 




percentage points in the wage premium. The tariff coefficient is positive in all 
models, but statistically significant only in models (3), (4), and (5).  
Although additional instruments are used here, the tariff coefficients of these models 
are smaller than the ones from table (3.2) models (3), (4), and (5). The first stage 
regressions F-statistics are all above ten. Productivity is stati ically significant in the 
first stage of all models, except model (3). In model (3) the material prices instrument 
is not statistically significant in its first stage r gression, and in model (6) neither 
1983 tariffs nor its interaction with coffee price are statistically significant. There’s 
no rejection in the over-identifying tests. The estima ed coefficients in table (3.5) are 
similar to the estimates from table (3.4), and again, the inclusion of the productivity 
variable affected the estimated tariff coefficient by decreasing it, in addition to 
explaining part of the variation in the wage premiu. 
 Then, table (3.5) models are estimated by instrumental variables technique 
considering both tariff and productivity as endogenous variables24, and a Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman25 endogeneity test for productivity is conducted. The results of the tests are 
reported on the bottom of table (3.5). In all specifications, the exogeneity of 
productivity can’t be rejected at 10% level of confidence. Thus, the possibility of 
reverse causation due to efficiency wages doesn’t seem relevant.  
                                                
24 The results are omitted but available upon request. 






Dependent Variables: wage premium 
2nd stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tariff 
(endogenous) 
0.092** 0.036 0.058 0.106** 0.078* 0.111** 
 [0.036] [0.065] [0.044] [0.026] [0.034] [0.032] 
Log TFP 
(exogenous) 
0.160** 0.176** 0.170** 0.156** 0.164** 0.155** 
 [0.043] [0.046] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [0.046] 












    Tariff 83  Tariffs 83 
       
Year dummies in 
2nd stage 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 63 63 63 63 63 63 
1st stage       
Year 1988  0.160** 0.129** 0.008 0.121** 0.087** 
  [0.027] [0.025] [0.032] [0.027] [0.038] 
Year 1990  0.131** 0.088** -0.080** 0.054* -0.011 
  [0.026] [0.026] [0.039 ] [0.029] [0.061] 
Year 1992  0.014 -0.039 -0.248** -0.082** -0.166** 
  [0.027] [0.026] [0.047] [0.032] [0.075] 
Year 1994  0.196** 0.157** 0.003 0.163** 0.135** 
  [0.030] [0.029] [0.039] [0.030] [0.038] 
Year 1996  0.194** 0.139** -0.074 0.141** 0.096** 
  [0.028] [0.028] [0.048] [0.029] [0.045] 
Year 1998  0.211** 0.137** -0.154** 0.163** 0.121** 
  [0.029] [0.030] [0.063] [0.029] [0.044] 
Log TFP  0.333** 0.293** 0.097 0.245** 0.172 
  [0.103] [0.095] [0.088] [0.099] [0.117] 
Tariffs 83  -0.183**  0.867**  0.182 
  [0.039]  [0.171]  [0.147] 
Exchange 
rate*Tariff 83 
  -0.002** -0.010**   
   [0.0003] [0.001]   
Coffee Price*Tariff 
83 
    -0.002** -0.004** 
     [0.0004] [0.002] 
Constant  -0.124** -0.069** 0.084** -0.064* -0.024 
  [0.027] [0.030] [0.039] [0.034] [0.046] 
F-statistic 1st stage  19.15 23.50 33.26 21.56 19.52 
Over identification 
test 
      
Hansen-Sargan 
Statistic 




Dependent variable is the 1st difference of wage premium, and all variables are in first difference. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on industry, and are reported in brackets. p-values are reported 
in parenthesis. All variables are used in their first difference. 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 







Dependent Variable: wage premium 
2nd stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tariff (endogenous) 0.031 0.050 0.097** 0.064* 0.073** 
 [0.052] [0.038] [0.025] [0.032] [0.030] 
Log TFP 
(exogenous) 
0.177** 0.172** 0.159** 0.168** 0.166** 
 [0.046] [0.045] [0.044] [0.046] [0.046] 
Instrument Tariffs 83  Tariffs 83  Tariffs 83 








 Log Stock of 
Capital 
Log Stock of 
Capital 
Log Stock of 
Capital 
Log Stock of 
Capital 












Year dummies in 
both stages 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
63 63 63 63 63 
1st Stage      
Log TFP 0.339** 0.292** 0.088 0.260** 0.235* 
 [0.101] [0.093] [0.088] [0.098] [0.118] 
Tariffs 83 -0.181**  0.810**  0.058 
 [0.037]  [0.169]  [0.152] 
Exchange 
rate*Tariff 83 
 -0.002** -0.009**   
  [0.0003] [0.001]   
Coffee Price*Tariff 
83 
   -0.002** -0.003 
    [0.0004] [0.002] 
Log Stock of Capital 0.074** 0.072** 0.062** 0.062** 0.058* 
 [0.027] [0.026] [0.021] [0.027] [0.029] 
Material Prices -0.191** -0.162* -0.066 -0.167* -0.161* 
 [0.087] [0.080] [0.070] [0.085] [0.087] 
Constant -0.115** -0.063** 0.080** -0.064* -0.52 
 [0.026] [0.029] [0.038] [0.032] [0.046] 
F-statistic 1st stage 18.51 22.49 31.19 19.65 17.58 
Over identification 
test 
     
Hansen-Sargan 
Statistic 
4.078 1.376 1.906 1.190 1.527 
(0.870) (0.497) (0.408) (0.448) (0.323) 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 
exogeneity of Log 
TFP 
0.264 0.211 1.652 0.223 1.768 
(0.607) (0.646) (0.199) (0.637) (0.184) 
Dependent variable is the 1st difference of wage premium, and all variables are in first difference. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on industry, and are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in 
parenthesis. All variables are used in their first difference. 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 - Equation (3.2) estimated by IV using only manufacturing industries with 







 In this chapter I assessed whether the import tariff effect over inter-industry 
wage premium depended on industries characteristics, and showed empirically that 
the omission of productivity variable (which affects both tariff setting and wage 
premium) leads to inconsistent estimations of the tariff effect over wage premium. 
 I found that the effect of tariffs depends on industries characteristics, because 
the wage premium only seemed to be affected by changes in tariffs in manufacturing 
and tradable industries. In the case approached here, the inclusion of sectors not 
affected by trade reform led to a five times smaller estimated impact of import tariffs 
on wage premium. 
 When productivity is incorporated in the estimated model, we can see that it 
indeed affects the wage premium and as an included instrument it is an important 
factor in import tariff setting. I found that the impact of the change in tariffs on the 
wage premium is about 50% smaller than the impact estimated using Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005) model with manufacturing data. The important lesson from this 
chapter is that using pre-reform import tariff levels as an instrument for changes in 
tariffs when the dependent variable is related to productivity is not a good idea. And 
in fact, this could be an explanation for the lack of effect of tariffs on wage premium 
in Brazil and Mexico, and for the positive effect found for India. 
 As a byproduct of my estimations, I found that productivity is an exogenous 




reason for reverse causation like efficiency wages (in its basic Shapiro-Stiglitz 







Proof of Propositions and Lemmas from Chapter 1 
 
Lemma 1. The determinant of the Jacobean matrix of the system (1.44) is positive. 









































































































































































ττ  (1.53) 
 Let's prove that the first term in the right-hand si e of equation (1.53) is larger 
than the second term: 
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Proposition 2. If the sufficient conditions (S1)-(S4) hold, a decrease inτ implies a 
decrease in the informal share ( foreignd
dshare
ττ




dshare < 0). 
1
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Proof. Since these are sufficient conditions, I need to prove that there's a positive 
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Proposition 4. If conditions (W1)-(W3) hold, a decrease in τ decreases the formal-




> 0) and a decrease in foreignτ  increases the formal-
informal wage gap (
 ττ
foreignd




(W1) ϕ  and w are independently Pareto distributed in which  1k  , 2k  > σ  > 2 are 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The third term is larger than the fourth term. In order to have the first term larger than 
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